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Abstract
We consider stability concepts for randommatchings where agents have preferences over
objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic,
the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property of no (justified) envy.
When matchings can be random, there are a number of natural stability / fairness
concepts that coincide with stability / no envy whenever matchings are deterministic.
We formalize known stability concepts for random matchings for a general setting that
allows weak preferences and weak priorities, unacceptability, and an unequal number
of agents and objects. We then present a clear taxonomy of the stability concepts and
identify logical relations between them. Furthermore, we provide no envy / claims
interpretations for some of the stability concepts that are based on a consumption
process interpretation of random matchings. Finally, we present a transformation from
the most general setting to the most restricted setting, and show how almost all our
stability concepts are preserved by that transformation.
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1 Introduction
We consider a model of matching agents to objects in which agents have pref-
erences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. This general
model has many applications, e.g., for school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez,
2003): in Boston (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Roth, and So¨nmez, 2005) and New York
(Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005), centralized matching schemes are employed to
assign students to schools on the basis of students’ preferences over schools and students’
priorities to be admitted to any given school. A school’s priority for a student might include
issues such as geographical proximity and whether the student has a sibling at the school
already, among others. Two surveys on school choice can be found in Abdulkadirog˘lu (2013)
and Pathak (2011).
Stability and no envy: For the most basic model we discuss in Section 2, the fundamental
stability concern is the following: no agent i should prefer an object o matched to another
agent j who has lower priority for the object than i. In school choice, this notion of stability
can be interpreted as the elimination of justified envy (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003;
Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999): a student can justifiably envy the match of another student to
a school if he likes that school better than his own match and he has a higher priority (with
a lower priority, envy might be present as well but is not justifiable). For the most general
model we discuss in Section 3, (weak) stability is equivalent to individual rationality, non-
wastefulness, and no justified envy. To simplify language, we from now on will refer to no
justified envy simply as no envy. While the important role of stability in matching problems
has long been recognized,1 no envy, which is a relaxation of stability, has only recently
gained independent interest. In particular, no envy has been considered in constrained
matching models (Ehlers, Halafir, Yenmez, and Yildirim, 2003; Kamada and Kojima, 2017)
and in senior level labor markets (Blum, Roth, and Rothblum, 1997) and shown to have
similar structural properties as stability (Wu and Roth, 2016). The well-known deferred-
acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) computes a deterministic matching that is
(weakly) stable and hence envy free.
Random and fractional matchings: Most articles on school choice and similar mod-
els have considered deterministic matchings. Instead, we consider random matchings that
1See, e.g., the advanced information document for the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in
Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012 awarded to A.E. Roth and L.S. Shapley “for the theory of stable allocations
and the practice of market design” URL: Advanced Information “Nobel Prize 2012”.
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specify the probability of each agent being matched to the various objects. Random match-
ings are useful to consider for several reasons. Firstly, randomization allows for a much
richer space of possible outcomes and may be essential to achieve fairness properties such
as anonymity2 and (ex-ante) equal-treatment-of-equals.3 It thus allows for a richer set of
mechanisms with the possibility of better properties: as pointed out by Kesten and U¨nver
(2015), a broader view of fairness has largely been ignored in prior work. Secondly, the frame-
work of random matchings also helps to reason about fractional matchings that capture time
sharing arrangements (Roth, Rothblum, and Vande Vate, 1993; Teo and Sethuraman, 1998;
Dog˘an and Yildiz, 2016). For example, an agent may allocate his time among several of his
matches rather than exclusively being matched to a single object. Mathematically, we then
simply consider the probability of an agent getting an object as the match of a corresponding
fraction of time to the object. Thirdly, randomization has proved to be useful to circumvent
impossibility results in social choice (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001; Brandl et al., 2016;
Dobzinski et al., 2006; Gibbard, 1977).
Whereas particular stability concepts for random / fractional matchings have been intro-
duced and studied in various papers, the picture of how exactly they relate to each other and
how their formulations change for various models (allowing for indifferences, unacceptability,
and a different number of agents / objects) has, to the best of our knowledge, not been
studied until now. This gap in the literature is especially important to address with the
renewed interest in recent years in random matching mechanisms.
Overview of the article: We consider some existing stability concepts (ex-post and frac-
tional stability, Roth et al., 1993, and Teo and Sethuraman, 1998; ex-ante / strong stability,
Roth et al., 1993, and Kesten and U¨nver, 2015; and claimwise stability, Afacan, 2015) and
also propose a new one, robust ex-post stability, that is nested between ex-ante stability and
ex-post stability. Many of the concepts have been defined and then subsequently studied only
for restricted settings that use one, some, or all of the following restrictions: (1) preferences
are strict, (2) priorities are strict, (3) there is an equal number of agents and objects, (4)
all objects and agents are acceptable to each other. We generalize all the stability concepts
mentioned above to the general random matching setting that allows for indifferences in
preferences and priorities, and allows for unacceptability as well as for an unequal number
of agents and objects. The general setting includes as a special case the hospital-resident
2An anonymous mechanism does not depend on the names of the agents.
3A mechanism satisfies (ex-ante) equal-treatment-of-equals if two equal agents (with the same preferences)
receive the same (ex-ante) allocation.
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setting in which hospitals have multiple positions but residents are indifferent among all such
positions at the same hospital; another example is the previously mentioned school choice
setting. The general model and our insights into the corresponding stability notions will pro-
vide a crucial stepping stone for further work on axiomatic, algorithmic, and market design
aspects of random stable matching.
In particular, we present a taxonomy of the stability concepts for random matching
of objects when objects have priorities for agents. Our study helps clarify the relations
between the different stability / fairness concepts mentioned above. This taxonomy also
points the market designer to consider a scale of criteria of different “stability-strengths”
while designing mechanisms, which additionally could also satisfy other properties (e.g.,
efficiency or strategic robustness). Furthermore, we provide no envy / claims interpretations
for some of the stability concepts that are based on a consumption process interpretation
of random matching. Finally, we present a transformation from the most general setting
(without any restrictions) to the most restricted setting (with restrictions (1) – (4)), and
show how almost all our stability concepts are preserved by that transformation.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the base model in which:
(1) preferences are strict, (2) priorities are strict, (3) there is an equal number of agents and
objects, (4) all objects and agents are acceptable to each other. For this model, stability
and no envy coincide. We introduce the random stability concepts ex-ante stability, robust
ex-post stability, ex-post stability, fractional stability, and claimwise stability and provide
consumption process interpretations for fractional and claimwise stability that are based on
specific envy / claim notions. We discuss the convexity of the stability concepts for random
matchings and present a complete taxonomy of the stability concepts for our base model
(see Figure 1).
Then, we extend the base model in two ways. First, in Section 2.3, we drop model
assumptions (1) and (2) and allow preferences and priorities to be weak. The switch from
strict preferences / priorities to weak ones requires various adjustments in definitions and
the consumption process interpretation, but once these adjustments are made, results change
very little (see Figure 2). Second, we drop model assumptions (3) and (4) and [allow for
an unequal number of agents and objects] and [that agents / objects find some objects /
agents unacceptable]. With this change, we add the well-known criteria of non-wastefulness
and individual rationality: for the general model that is considered now, (weak) stability is
equivalent with no envy, non-wastefulness, and individual rationality. We then formalize all
stability concepts with the appropriate additional requirements of non-wastefulness and/or
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individual rationality when necessary to preserve the hierarchy we established in the base
model. We use a transformation from the most general setting to the most restricted setting
for random matchings to show how almost all our stability concepts are preserved by that
transformation4 and to establish a complete taxonomy of stability concepts for the general
model (see Figure 4).
2 The base model
Let N be a set of n agents and O be a set of n objects . Each agent i ∈ N has preferences
≻i over O and each object o ∈ O has priorities ≻o for N (although using the same notation,
the reason we use the term priorities instead of the term preferences is that objects are not
considered as economic agents in our model). Agents’ preferences are strict orders over O
and objects’ priorities are strict orders over N .
We’ll explain later on how the model and results extend when preferences and priorities
can be weak (Section 2.3) and when allowing for unacceptability as well as different numbers
of agents and objects (Section 3).
A random matching p is a bistochastic n× n matrix [p(i, o)]i∈N,o∈O, i.e.,
for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O, p(i, o) ≥ 0, (1)
for each i ∈ N,
∑
o∈O
p(i, o) = 1, and (2)
for each o ∈ O,
∑
i∈N
p(i, o) = 1. (3)
Random matchings are often also referred to as fractional matchings (Roth et al., 1993;
Teo and Sethuraman, 1998). For each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O, the value p(i, o) represents the
probability of object o being matched to agent i and agent i’smatch is the probability vector
p(i) = (p(i, o))o∈O. A random matching p is deterministic if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O,
p(i, o) ∈ {0, 1}. Alternatively, a deterministic matching is an integer solution to linear
inequalities (1), (2), and (3).
4With one exception: due to some lack of symmetry in the definition of claimwise (weak) stability, full
equivalence under the transformation fails (Proposition 30 and Example 7).
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By Birkhoff (1946) and Von Neumann (1953), each random matching can be represented
as a convex combination of deterministic matchings: a decomposition of a random match-
ing p into deterministic matchings Pj (j ∈ {1, . . . , k}) equals a sum p =
∑k
j=1 λjPj such that
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, λj ∈ (0, 1] and
∑k
j=1 λj = 1.
2.1 Stability concepts
Definition 1 (No envy / stability for deterministic matchings). A deterministic
matching p has no envy or is stable if there exists no agent i who is matched to object
o′ but prefers object o while object o is matched to some agent j with lower priority than i,
i.e., there exist no i, j ∈ N and no o, o′ ∈ O such that p(i, o′) = 1, p(j, o) = 1, o ≻i o
′, and
i ≻o j.
Stability was first introduced for two-sided matching markets by Gale and Shapley (1962).
The terminology of no justified envy is usually used in the context of the so-called school
choice model (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). Note that we
use the shorter expression no envy for the somewhat more precise no justified envy (see also
Wu and Roth, 2016).
A deterministic matching p is stable if and only if it satisfies the following inequalities
(Roth et al., 1993):5 for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O,
p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j≻oi
p(j, o) ≥ 1. (4)
The well-known deferred-acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) computes a de-
terministic matching that is stable.
We now define five stability concepts for random matchings that all coincide with deter-
ministic stability when the random matching is deterministic.
The first stability concept for random matchings we consider was discussed by Roth et al.
(1993) under the name of strong stability for the marriage market matching model. Recently,
for a school choice model, Kesten and U¨nver (2015) obtained the same stability concept by
extending no envy from matched whole objects to matched probability shares of objects;
the intuition here is that a higher priority agent i envies a lower priority agent j for any
5Roth et al. (1993) consider a more general model that lies between the models we discuss in Section 2.3
and Section 3. We here use the restriction of their original inequalities to our base model.
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probability share of object o that agent j has if he would like to get a higher probability of
it himself. We will discuss and prove later in this section that Aharoni and Fleiner (2003)
introduced a stability concept for a more general model of so-called hypergraphic preference
systems that coincides with ex-ante stability.
Definition 2 (No ex-ante envy / ex-ante stability). A random matching p has no
ex-ante envy or is ex-ante stable if there exists no agent i who is matched with positive
probability to object o′ but prefers object o to object o′ while object o is matched with
positive probability to some agent j with lower priority than i, i.e., there exist no i, j ∈ N
and no o, o′ ∈ O such that p(i, o′) > 0, p(j, o) > 0, o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j.
Although normatively appealing, the notion of ex-ante stability is demanding. It follows
from Roth et al. (1993, Corollary 21) that each agent can receive probability shares of, at
most, two objects and vice versa, each object is assigned with positive probability to at
most two agents. In other words, an ex-ante stable random matching is almost deterministic.
Schlegel (2016) generalizes this result to the more general set-up with quotas and priority
ties as follows: ex-ante stable random matchings have small support, meaning that only
few agent-object pairs have a positive probability of being matched. The number of pairs
in the support depends on how many indifferences in the priorities the random matching
exploits. In the extreme case where no object is matched with positive probability to two
equal priority agents, the probability distribution is almost deterministic. Otherwise, the
size of the support is completely determined by the size of the lowest priority classes at
which agents are matched to the respective objects. This result can be interpreted as an
impossibility result: with ex-ante stability one cannot go much beyond randomly breaking
ties and implementing a (deterministically) stable matching with respect to the broken ties.
The second stability concept for random matchings we consider is ex-post stability.
Definition 3 (Ex-post stability). A random matching p is ex-post stable if it can be
decomposed into deterministic stable matchings.
For a one-to-one marriage market setup, Dog˘an and Yildiz (2016) show that for each ex-
post stable random matching, there is a utility profile consistent with the ordinal preferences
such that no group of agents consisting of equal numbers of men and women can deviate
to a random matching among themselves and make each member better off in an expected
utility sense. For real world applications, ex-post stability has the desirable feature that a
deterministic stable matching can be drawn from the existing probability distribution and
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be implemented. Various authors (Vande Vate, 1989; Rothblum, 1992; Roth et al., 1993)
proved that ex-post stability is in fact characterized by inequalities (1), (2), (3), and (4): the
extreme points of the polytope defined by these linear inequalities are exactly the (incidence
vectors of the) deterministically stable matchings. A random matching is hence ex-post
stable if it is a (not necessarily integer) solution to the linear inequalities. However, the fact
that an ex-post stable matching is also a solution to a system of inequalities and vice versa is
not a trivial result and one can use the inequalities (1), (2), (3), and (4) to define a separate
stability concept. This leads to our third stability concept for random matchings, fractional
stability.
Definition 4 (Fractional stability and violations of fractional stability). A random
matching p is fractionally stable if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O,
p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j≻oi
p(j, o) ≥ 1, 6 (4)
or more compactly, ∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) ≥
∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o). (5)
A violation of fractional stability occurs if there exists a pair (i, o) ∈ N ×O such that
∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o) >
∑
o:o′≻io
p(i, o′). (6)
We next explain fractional stability as a no envy notion. To this end, we first need to
explain what we mean by the term consumption process.
Consumption process: an agent i’s match p(i) can be obtained by the following (step-
wise) consumption process. We imagine that each object is represented by one unit of a
homogeneously divisible pie that agents can consume and each agent wants exactly one unit
of pie in total. The probability shares agents receive at p are the fractions of the pies that
the agents receive when they eat from one pie at a time, at equal speed, and in decreasing
preference order, i.e., we imagine the match of each agent is the result of a consumption pro-
cess at which they first consume the best object with positive probability share at p, then
6If inequalities (4) hold, Roth et al. (1993) have also shown that for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O, p(i, o) > 0
implies p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j≻oi
p(j, o) = 1.
8
the second best object with positive probability share at p, etc. For example, consider an
agent i with ≻i: x y z and p(i, x) =
1
8
, p(i, y) = 1
2
, and p(i, z) = 3
8
. Then, in the consumption
process, agent i consumes first 1
8
of object pie x, second 1
2
of object pie y, and third 3
8
of
object pie z.
Inequality (6) implies
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1, i.e., agent i receives some fraction of an object
in his strict lower contour set at o (if not, this would imply that
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′)+ p(i, o) = 1
and hence,
∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o) + p(i, o) > 1; a contradiction to feasibility). Thus, agent i would
want to consume more of object o. Inequality (6) also implies
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) < 1, i.e., object
o receives some fraction of an agent in its strict lower contour set at i. Thus, object o would
want to consume more of agent i. Moreover, strict inequality (6) encodes the following envy
notion: using consumption process language, as long as agent i consumes objects that are
better than o he does not envy the set of lower priority agents to jointly consume fractions
of o, however, once the lower priority agents have consumed as much of o as agent i’s strict
upper contour set at o, agent i starts having envy towards them for any additional amounts
of o (unless agent i can fill his remaining probability quota with object o).
Remark 1 (A symmetric reformulation of fractional stability and its violations).
In the definition of fractional stability by inequalities (5) and of a violation of fractional
stability by inequality (6) we have taken the viewpoint of an agent who considers the con-
sumptions of lower priority agents for an object. The symmetric formulations when taking
the viewpoint of an object that “considers” the matches of lower preferred objects to an agent
are as follows. A random matching p is fractionally stable if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N ×O,
∑
j:j≻oi
p(j, o) ≥
∑
o′:o′≺io
p(i, o′). (5’)
We can write a violation of fractional stability as, there exists a pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such
that ∑
o′:o′≺io
p(i, o′) >
∑
j:j≻oi
p(j, o). (6’)
⋄
Aharoni and Fleiner (2003) introduced a stability concept that they also called frac-
tional stability for a more general model of so-called hypergraphic preference systems.
Biro´ and Fleiner (2016) extended the Aharoni-Fleiner notion of fractional stability to an
even more general model of NTU coalition formation games. We note here that fractional
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stability as defined by Aharoni and Fleiner (2003) and Biro´ and Fleiner (2016) is not equiv-
alent to fractional stability considered in this paper. In fact, it is equivalent to ex-ante
stability.
Definition 5 (Aharoni-Fleiner fractional stability). A random matching p is Aharoni-
Fleiner fractionally stable if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O,
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) = 1 or
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) = 1.
Proposition 1. A random matching is Aharoni-Fleiner fractionally stable if and only if it
has no ex-ante envy.
Proof. Suppose random matching p has ex-ante envy. Then, there exist i, j ∈ N and
o, o′ ∈ O such that p(i, o′) > 0, p(j, o) > 0, o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j. Thus, there exists a pair
(i, o) ∈ N × O such that
∑
o′′:o′′%io
p(i, o′′) < 1 and
∑
k:k%oi
p(k, o) < 1. Hence, p is not
Aharoni-Fleiner fractionally stable.
Suppose random matching p is not Aharoni-Fleiner fractionally stable. Then, there exists
a pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such that
∑
o′′:o′′%io
p(i, o′′) < 1 and
∑
k:k%oi
p(k, o) < 1. Thus, there
exist i, j ∈ N and o, o′ ∈ O such that p(i, o′) > 0, p(j, o) > 0, o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j. Hence, p
has ex-ante envy.
Our fourth stability concept for random matchings is based on a new stability concept
suggested by Afacan (2015) for a model with weak priorities. Here, we focus exclusively on
the strict priority part of his stability concept even though we use the same name (Afacan has
some additional conditions addressing equal priority agents that capture aspects of “equal
treatment of equals” that are not related to stability). According to Afacan (2015), an agent
i ∈ N has a claim against an agent j ∈ N , if there exists an object o ∈ O such that i ≻o j
and
p(j, o) >
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′). (7)
A random matching is claimwise stable if it does not admit any claim.
Definition 6 (Claimwise stability). A random matching p is claimwise stable if for
each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O and each j ∈ N such that i ≻o j,
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) ≥ p(j, o). (8)
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Claimwise stability is a no envy notion based on having a claim. Inequality (7) implies∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1, i.e., agent i receives some fraction of an object in his strict lower
contour set at o (if not, this would imply that
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) + p(i, o) = 1 and hence,
p(j, o) + p(i, o) > 1; a contradiction to feasibility). Thus, agent i would want to consume
more of object o. Moreover, strict inequality (7) encodes the following envy notion: using
consumption process language, as long as agent i consumes objects that are better than o
he does not envy lower priority agent j to consume fractions of o, however, once agent j has
consumed as much of o as agent i’s strict upper contour set at o, agent i starts having envy
towards him for any additional amounts of o (unless agent i can fill his remaining probability
quota with object o).
Our fifth stability concept for random matchings, robust ex-post stability, is a natural
strengthening of ex-post stability.7
Definition 7 (Robust ex-post stability). A random matching p is robust ex-post stable
if all its decompositions are into deterministic and stable matchings.
It follows easily that if we restrict attention to deterministic matchings, then all the
stability concepts for random matchings coincide with stability / no envy (Definition 1). For
completeness, we provide a short proof of Proposition 2 at the end of Section 2.2.
Proposition 2. For deterministic matchings, all the stability concepts for random matchings
coincide with stability / no envy for deterministic matchings.
Next, we say that a stability concept ∗ is convex if the convex combination of ∗-stable
matchings is ∗-stable as well (∗-stability stands for any of our stability concepts for random
matchings). Since the stability constraints for fractional and claimwise stability are linear,
there are simple (linear) arguments why both stability concepts are convex. We will later
show that ex-ante stability and robust ex-post stability are not convex.
Lemma 1. Fractional stability is convex.
7Kesten and U¨nver (2015) pointed out that “Although ex post stability is a meaningful interpretation of
fairness for deterministic outcomes, for lottery mechanisms such as those used for school choice, its suitability
as the right fairness notion is less clear.” They then proceed to analyze the stronger stability concept of
ex-ante stability, which is a very strong stability requirement. We show that robust ex-post stability is
weaker than ex-ante stability and stronger than ex-post stability and hence it is a good compromise between
these competing stability concepts. Robust ex-post stability strengthens ex-post stability in a similar way
as robust ex-post efficiency (Aziz et al., 2015) strengthens ex-post efficiency.
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Proof. Let p and q be fractionally stable random matchings. Then, by Inequality (5), for
each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O, ∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) ≥
∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o)
and ∑
o′:o′≻io
q(i, o′) ≥
∑
j:j≺oi
q(j, o).
Then it follows that for each λ ∈ [0, 1],
λ
[ ∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′)
]
+ (1− λ)
[ ∑
o′:o′≻io
q(i, o′)
]
≥ λ
[ ∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o)
]
+ (1− λ)
[ ∑
j:j≺oi
q(j, o)
]
and ∑
o′:o′≻io
[
λp+ (1− λ)q
]
(i, o′) ≥
∑
j:j≺oi
[
λp+ (1− λ)q
]
(j, o).
The proof for the convexity of claimwise stability is similar and we omit it.
Lemma 2. Claimwise stability is convex.
Remark 2 (Core and stability concepts based on stochastic dominance and vNM
preferences / priorities). A deterministic matching is in the core if no coalition of agents
and objects can improve by rematching among themselves, i.e., a deterministic matching p
is in the core if there exists no set N ′ ∪ O′ ⊆ N ∪ O and no deterministic matching p′ 6= p
such that (i) for each i′ ∈ N ′,
∑
o∈O′ p
′(i′, o) = 1, (ii) for each o′ ∈ O′,
∑
i∈N ′ p
′(i, o′) = 1,
and (iii) for all i′ ∈ N ′, i ∈ N , o′ ∈ O′, and o ∈ O, [if p(i′, o) = 1 and p′(i′, o′) = 1, then
o′ %i′ o] and [if p(i, o
′) = 1 and p′(i′, o′) = 1, then i′ %o′ i]. It is well known that for the
base model (and its extension with strict preferences / priorities), the core equals the set of
stable deterministic matchings.
For random matchings, one can extend preferences / priorities over objects / agents to
random matches via von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utilities or the (incomplete) first or-
der stochastic dominance extension. Manjunath (2013) studies various extensions of stability
and the core from deterministic to random matchings using vNM utilities, stochastic dom-
inance requiring comparability, and stochastic dominance without requiring comparability.
Manjunath (2013) points out that for strict preferences / priorities an ex-post stable random
matching is a “weak stochastic dominance core matching” (Manjunath, 2013, Proposition 3).
The same observation also follows from Theorem 2 of Dog˘an and Yildiz (2016).
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We prove in Appendix A two new results that clarify the relation of strong and weak
dominance stability as defined in Manjunath (2013) with some of our stability properties:
(1) a random matching is a “strong stochastic dominance stable matching” if and only if it
is ex-ante stable and (2) a random matching that is claimwise stable is a “weak stochastic
dominance stable matching”.
Our approach is complementary to that of Manjunath (2013) in that we focus on existing
stability concepts with some focus on their underlying linear programming origin and possible
fairness interpretations while he introduces new stability and core concepts based on how
preferences / priorities are extended from deterministic to random matchings. ⋄
2.2 Relations between stability concepts
We now provide a complete taxonomy of the stability concepts for random matchings we
have introduced (see Figure 1).
Section 2.2 results: For random matchings we have
ex-ante stability (Def. 2)
robust ex-post stability (Def. 7)
ex-post stability (Def. 3)
fractional stability (Def. 4)
claimwise stability (Def. 6)
Prop. 3
Prop. 5
Prop. 7
Prop. 9
Prop. 4
Prop. 6
Prop. 8
Prop. 10
Figure 1: Relations between stability concepts for random matchings.
Proposition 3. Ex-ante stability implies robust ex-post stability.
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Proof. Consider a random matching p that is not robust ex-post stable. This means that p
can be decomposed into deterministic matchings such that one of them is not stable. Let q
be such an unstable deterministic matching. Since q is unstable, there exist agents i, j ∈ N
and objects o, o′ ∈ O such that q(i, o′) = 1, q(j, o) = 1, o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j. Since q is part
of a decomposition of p (with positive weight), it follows that then p(i, o′) > 0, p(j, o) > 0,
o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j. Hence, p is not ex-ante stable.
The following example shows that even if a random matching is ex-ante stable (and hence
robust ex-post stable), the decomposition into stable deterministic matchings need not be
unique.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and O = {w, x, y, z}. Consider the following preferences
and priorities:
≻1: w x y z
≻2: x w z y
≻3: y z w x
≻4: z y x w
≻w: 2 1 4 3
≻x: 1 2 3 4
≻y: 4 3 2 1
≻z : 3 4 1 2
There are four deterministic stable matchings:
p1 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 p2 =


1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0


p3 =


0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 p4 =


0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0


It is easy to check that the following random matching is ex-ante and hence also robust
ex-post stable:
q =


1/2 1/2 0 0
1/2 1/2 0 0
0 0 1/2 1/2
0 0 1/2 1/2

 .
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There exist exactly two decompositions of q into (stable) deterministic matchings:
q =
1
2
p1 +
1
2
p4 =
1
2
p2 +
1
2
p3.
Hence, the decomposition of q into stable deterministic matchings is not unique. ⋄
Proposition 4. Robust ex-post stability does not imply ex-ante stability.
Proof. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and O = {x, y, z}. Consider the following preferences and prior-
ities; they are the same as in Roth et al. (1993, Example 2) but we use them to prove a
different statement:
≻1: x y z
≻2: y z x
≻3: z x y
≻x: 2 3 1
≻y: 3 1 2
≻z : 1 2 3
Then, consider pA, which is the deterministic agent optimal stable matching,8
pA =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1


≻1: x y z
≻2: y z x
≻3: z x y
and consider pO, which is the deterministic object optimal stable matching,9
pO =


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0


≻1: x y z
≻2: y z x
≻3: z x y.
Let q = 1
2
pA + 1
2
pO. Thus,
q =


1/2 0 1/2
1/2 1/2 0
0 1/2 1/2

 .
We first show that q’s only decomposition into deterministic matchings is the one with respect
to pA and pO: if the decomposition involves a deterministic matching in which agent 1 gets
object x, then the only deterministic matching consistent with q is pA (because q(2, z) = 0); if
the decomposition involves a deterministic matching in which agent 1 gets object z, then the
only deterministic matching consistent with q is pO (because q(3, x) = 0); since q(1, y) = 0,
8The deterministic agent optimal stable matching can be computed by using the agent proposing deferred-
acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
9The deterministic object optimal stable matching can be computed by using the object proposing
deferred-acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962).
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no deterministic matching consistent with q allows for agent 1 to get object y. Hence, we
have proven that a convex decomposition of q can only involve deterministic matchings pA
and pO. Since both pA and pO are stable, it follows that q is robust ex-post stable.
Second, we show that q is not ex-ante stable. Note that for agents 1, 2 ∈ N and objects
z, y ∈ O we have that q(1, z) > 0, q(2, y) > 0, 1 ≻y 2, and y ≻1 z, i.e., agent 1 ex-ante envies
agent 2 for his probability share of object y. Hence, q is not ex-ante stable.
Thus, q is robust ex-post stable but not ex-ante stable.
Proposition 5. Robust ex-post stability implies ex-post stability.
Proof. By definition, if all decompositions of the random matching involve deterministic sta-
ble matchings, then there exists at least one decomposition that involves only deterministic
stable matchings.
Proposition 6. Ex-post stability does not imply robust ex-post stability.
Proof. Our example and proof is the same as in Roth et al. (1993, Example 2). Let N =
{1, 2, 3} and O = {x, y, z}. Consider the following preferences and priorities:
≻1: x y z
≻2: y z x
≻3: z x y
≻x: 2 3 1
≻y: 3 1 2
≻z : 1 2 3
Then, consider pA, which is the deterministic agent optimal stable matching,
pA =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1


≻1: x y z
≻2: y z x
≻3: z x y
and consider pO, which is the deterministic object optimal stable matching,
pO =


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0


≻1: x y z
≻2: y z x
≻3: z x y.
The only other deterministic stable matching is
p =


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0


≻1: x y z
≻2: y z x
≻3: z x y.
Let q be the uniform random matching. Thus,
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q =


1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3

 .
Note that
q =
1
3


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

+ 1
3


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0

+ 1
3


0 1 0
0 0 1
1 0 0

 = 1
3
pA +
1
3
pO +
1
3
p.
Since q can be decomposed into deterministic stable matchings, it is ex-post stable.
We now show that the uniform random matching q is not robust ex-post stable. Note
that
q =
1
3


0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1

+ 1
3


0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0

+ 1
3


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0


where all the deterministic matchings in the decomposition are unstable. Hence, q is not
robust ex-post stable.
Thus, q is ex-post stable but not robust ex-post stable.
Next, as already mentioned when introducing fractional stability, fractional stability is
equivalent to ex-post stability (see Roth et al., 1993; Teo and Sethuraman, 1998). This equiv-
alence is based on the insight by Vande Vate (1989) that both stability concepts are convex
with deterministic stable matchings as extreme points (we show in Proposition 17 that once
preferences and priorities can be weak, this statement isn’t correct anymore for the convex
set of fractionally weakly stable random matchings). We add the proofs for completeness.
Proposition 7. Ex-post stability implies fractional stability.
Proof. If a random matching is ex-post stable then by definition it can be written as a convex
combination of deterministic stable matchings. All of these deterministic stable matchings
are fractionally stable. Since the set of fractionally stable matchings is convex (Lemma 1),
a convex combination of deterministic stable matchings is fractionally stable.
Proposition 8. Fractional stability implies ex-post stability.
Proof. As already mentioned when introducing fractional stability, for strict priorities, the
extreme points of the polytope defined by the linear inequalities (1), (2), (3), and (4) are
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exactly the (incidence vectors of the) deterministically stable matchings (Vande Vate, 1989;
Rothblum, 1992; Roth et al., 1993). Since, by definition, fractionally stable random match-
ings are solutions to the linear inequalities, a fractionally stable random matching can be
decomposed into deterministic stable matchings, which implies that a fractionally stable
random matching is ex-post stable.
Proposition 9. Fractional stability implies claimwise stability.
Proof. Consider a random matching p that is not claimwise stable. Then, for some pair
(i, o) ∈ N ×O and some j ∈ N such that i ≻o j, strict inequality (7) applies:
p(j, o) >
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′),
i.e., agent i has a claim against agent j with respect to object o. But this implies that
∑
k:k≺oi
p(k, o) >
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′).
Hence, p is not fractionally stable. Thus, fractional stability implies claimwise stability.
Proposition 10. Claimwise stability does not imply ex-post / fractional stability.
Proof. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and O = {x, y, z}. Consider the following preferences and priori-
ties:
≻1: x z y
≻2: y x z
≻3: z x y
≻x: 2 3 1
≻y: 1 3 2
≻z : 2 1 3
Then, consider pA, which is the deterministic agent optimal stable matching,
pA =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1


≻1: x z y
≻2: y x z
≻3: z x y
and consider pO, which is the deterministic object optimal stable matching,
pO =


0 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 0


≻1: x z y
≻2: y x z
≻3: z x y.
Let q be the uniform random matching. Thus,
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q =


1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3

 .
First, since pO is the deterministic object optimal stable matching, agent 1 does not get
y in any deterministic stable matching. Hence, random matching q is not ex-post stable.
Alternatively, we can check that fractional stability is violated and inequality (6) holds for
agent 2 and object x:
2
3
=
∑
j:j≺x2
q(j, x) >
∑
o′:o′≻2x
q(2, o′) =
1
3
.
Second, we show that random matching q is claimwise stable by checking if there are claims
of an agent i against an agent j, i.e., are there (i, o) ∈ N × O and j ∈ N such that i ≻o j
and q(j, o) >
∑
o′:o′≻io
q(i, o′)? We show that there are no claims.
• For an agent i ∈ N , a claim for a higher probability for his most preferred object
against any of the other agents is not justified because all other agents have higher
priority for that object.
• For an agent i ∈ N , a claim for a higher probability for his second preferred object
against any of the other agents is not justified because he gets an object in the strict
upper contour set of his second preferred object with probability 1/3 whereas any other
agent also gets that object with probability 1/3 (a probability that is not higher).
• No agent i ∈ N would claim a higher probability for his least preferred object (because
he gets an object in the strict upper contour set of his least preferred object with
probability 2/3 whereas any other agent only gets that object with probability 1/3).
We conclude with a proof of Proposition 2. We show that for deterministic matchings,
all the stability concepts for random matchings coincide with stability for deterministic
matchings.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let deterministic matching p be stable and note that for deter-
ministic matchings no envy implies ex-ante stability (as also noted by Kesten and U¨nver,
2015). By Proposition 3, p is robust ex-post stable; by Proposition 5, p is ex-post stable; by
Proposition 7, p is fractionally stable; and by Proposition 9, p is claimwise stable. We are
done if we can show that any deterministic claimwise stable matching is stable. Assume, by
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contradiction, that there exists a deterministic matching q that is claimwise stable but not
stable. Then, there exist i, j ∈ N and o, o′ ∈ O such that q(i, o′) = 1, q(j, o) = 1, o ≻i o
′, and
i ≻o j. But then, 1 = q(j, o) >
∑
o′′:o′′≻io
p(i, o′′) = 0 and agent i has a claim against agent j.
Afacan (2015) also proved that any deterministic claimwise stable matching is stable.
We next extend our base model and corresponding results in two steps. First adding
weak preferences and weak priorities (Section 2.3) and second allowing for unacceptability
and a different number of agents and objects (Section 3) allows us to separately show the
required adjustments in the stability concepts and the associated proof techniques required
when (stepwise) extending the base model.
2.3 Weak preferences and weak priorities
Recall that with strict preferences and strict priorities, a deterministic matching p is stable
if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N ×O,
p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j≻oi
p(j, o) ≥ 1. (4)
If preferences or priorities can be weak, i.e., agents’ preferences are weak orders over O
and objects’ priorities are weak orders over N , then various deterministic stability notions
with varying degrees of strength are possible (see Irving, 1994). A deterministic matching p
is weakly stable if there is no strict blocking agent-object pair such that, by being matched,
each would be strictly better off than at their current matches at p. In the case of strong
stability, there is no weak blocking agent-object pair such that, by being matched, one of them
is strictly better off, whilst the other must be no worse off than at their current matches
at p. While for weak preferences and weak priorities, weakly stable deterministic matchings
always exist, it is well known that the set of strongly stable deterministic matchings may be
empty. Furthermore, we consider the absence of strict blocking pairs as the most natural no
envy / stability notion and therefore focus on weak stability.
Definition 8 (No envy / weak stability for deterministic matchings). A deterministic
matching p has no envy or is weakly stable if there exists no agent i who is matched to
object o′ but prefers object o while object o is matched to some agent j with lower priority
than i, i.e., there exist no i, j ∈ N and no o, o′ ∈ O such that p(i, o′) = 1, p(j, o) = 1, o ≻i o
′,
and i ≻o j.
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A deterministic matching p is weakly stable if it satisfies the following inequalities: for
each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O,
p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o) ≥ 1. (9)
If one breaks all preference and priority ties, then the well-known deferred-acceptance
algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) computes a deterministic matching that is weakly stable.
The definitions of ex-ante, ex-post, and robust ex-post stability essentially remain the
same as before.
Definition 9 (No ex-ante envy / ex-ante weak stability). A random matching p has
no ex-ante envy or is ex-ante weakly stable if there exists no agent i who is matched
with positive probability to object o′ but prefers a higher probability for object o while object
o is matched with positive probability to some agent j with lower priority than i, i.e., there
exists no i, j ∈ N and no o, o′ ∈ O such that p(i, o′) > 0, p(j, o) > 0, o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j.
Note that the definition of Aharoni-Fleiner fractional stability (Definition 5) remains the
same and its equivalence to no ex-ante envy follows as before.
Definition 10 (Ex-post weak stability). A random matching p is ex-post weakly stable
if it can be decomposed into deterministic weakly stable matchings.
Definition 11 (Robust ex-post weak stability). A random matching p is robust ex-
post weakly stable if all its decompositions are into deterministic weakly stable matchings.
Next, the definition of deterministic weak stability leads to the following associated sta-
bility concept (by relaxing the “integer solution requirement” for inequalities (9)).
Definition 12 (Fractional weak stability and violations of fractional weak stabil-
ity). A random matching p is fractionally weakly stable if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O,
p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o) ≥ 1, (9)
or more compactly, ∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) ≥
∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o). (10)
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A violation of fractional weak stability occurs if there exists a pair (i, o) ∈ N ×O
such that ∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o) >
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′). (11)
Inequality (11) implies
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1, i.e., agent i receives some fraction of an object
in his strict lower contour set at o (if not, this would imply that
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′)+p(i, o) =
1 and hence,
∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o) + p(i, o) > 1; a contradiction to feasibility). Thus, agent i would
want to consume more of object o. Inequality (11) also implies
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) < 1, i.e., object
o receives some fraction of an agent in its strict lower contour set at i. Thus, object o would
want to consume more of agent i. Moreover, strict inequality (11) encodes the following
envy notion: using consumption process language, as long as agent i consumes objects that
are different from and not worse than o he does not envy the set of lower priority agents to
jointly consume fractions of o, however, once the set of lower priority agents have consumed
as much of o as agent i’s weak upper contour set at o (not including o), agent i starts having
envy towards them for any additional amounts of o (unless agent i can fill his remaining
probability quota with object o).
Remark 3 (A symmetric reformulation of fractional weak stability and its viola-
tions). In the definition of fractional weak stability by inequalities (10) and of a violation
of fractional weak stability by inequality (11) we have taken the viewpoint of an agent who
considers the consumptions of lower priority agents for an object. The symmetric formula-
tions when taking the viewpoint of an object that “considers” the matches of lower preferred
objects to an agent are as follows. A random matching p is fractionally weakly stable if for
each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O, ∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o) ≥
∑
o′:o′≺io
p(i, o′). (10’)
We can write a violation of fractional weak stability as, there exists a pair (i, o) ∈ N × O
such that ∑
o′:o′≺io
p(i, o′) >
∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o). (11’)
⋄
The following lemma follows from the definition of fractional weak stability via linear
inequalities.
Lemma 3. Fractional weak stability is convex.
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When preferences can be weak, then the notion of a claim can be adjusted as follows:
using consumption process language, as long as agent i consumes objects that are different
from and not worse than o he does not envy lower priority agent j to consume fractions of
o, however, once agent j has consumed as much of o as agent i’s weak upper contour set at
o (not including o), agent i starts having envy towards him for any additional amounts of o
(unless agent i can fill his remaining probability quota with object o). An agent i ∈ N has
a claim against an agent j ∈ N , if there exists an object o ∈ O such that i ≻o j and
p(j, o) >
∑
o:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′). (12)
Inequality (12) implies
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1, i.e., agent i receives some fraction of an object in
his strict lower contour set at o (if not, this would imply that
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′)+p(i, o) = 1
and hence, p(j, o) + p(i, o) > 1; a contradiction to feasibility). Thus, agent i would want to
consume more of object o.
A random matching is claimwise weakly stable if it does not admit any claim.
Definition 13 (Claimwise weak stability). A random matching p is claimwise weakly
stable if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N ×O and each j ∈ N such that i ≻o j,
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) ≥ p(j, o). (13)
The following lemma follows from the definition of claimwise weak stability via linear
inequalities.
Lemma 4. Claimwise weak stability is convex.
It follows easily that if we restrict attention to deterministic matchings, then all the weak
stability concepts for random matchings coincide with standard weak stability / no envy
(Definition 8). The proof of Proposition 11 follows the same arguments as the proof of our
previous Proposition 2 and we therefore omit it.
Proposition 11. For deterministic matchings, all the weak stability concepts for random
matchings with weak preferences and weak priorities coincide with weak stability / no envy
for deterministic matchings.
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Our taxonomy of the stability concepts for random matchings with weak preferences and
weak priorities now looks as follows (see Figure 2).
Section 2.3 results: For random matchings we have
ex-ante weak stability (Def. 9)
robust ex-post weak stability (Def. 11)
fractional weak stability (Def. 12)
ex-post weak stability (Def. 10)
claimwise weak stability (Def. 13)
Prop. 12
Prop. 14
Prop. 16
Prop. 18
Prop. 13
Prop. 15
Prop. 17
Prop. 19
Figure 2: Relations between stability concepts for random matchings with weak prefer-
ences and weak priorities.
The arguments in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 remain valid to prove that ex-ante
weak stability implies robust ex-post weak stability but not vice versa.
Proposition 12. Ex-ante weak stability implies robust ex-post weak stability.
Proposition 13. Robust ex-post weak stability does not imply ex-ante weak stability.
The arguments in the proofs of Propositions 5 and 6 remain valid to prove that robust
ex-post weak stability implies ex-post weak stability but not vice versa.
Proposition 14. Robust ex-post weak stability implies ex-post weak stability.
Proposition 15. Ex-post weak stability does not imply robust ex-post weak stability.
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The arguments in the proof of Proposition 7 remain valid to prove that ex-post weak
stability implies fractional weak stability.
Proposition 16. Ex-post weak stability implies fractional weak stability.
However, Proposition 8 does not extend to weak preferences and weak priorities. The
example to prove this is due to Battal Dog˘an.
Proposition 17. Fractional weak stability does not imply ex-post weak stability.
Proof. LetN = {1, 2, 3} and O = {x, y, z}. Consider the following preferences and priorities
(the brackets indicate indifferences):
≻1: [x y z]
≻2: y x z
≻3: [x y z]
≻x: [2 3] 1
≻y: [1 2 3]
≻z : [1 2 3]
Consider random matching q, which is fractionally weakly stable because agents 1 and 3
only get best objects and from agent 2’s perspective no agent with a lower priority consumes
his best object y, which he receives with probability 1
2
, and agent 2, who does have a lower
priority for object x does not consume more that 1
2
of x,
q =


1/2 0 1/2
0 1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 0

 .
Note that random matching q has a unique decomposition into the deterministic matchings
p1 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 1 0

 p2 =


0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0


such that q = 1
2
p1 + 1
2
p2. However, deterministic matching p1 is weakly unstable because
agent 2 justifiably envies agent 1. Hence, random matching q is not ex-post weakly stable.
The arguments in the proofs of Propositions 9 and 10 remain valid to prove that fractional
weak stability implies claimwise weak stability but not vice versa.
Proposition 18. Fractional weak stability implies claimwise weak stability.
Proposition 19. Claimwise weak stability does not imply fractional weak stability.
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3 Generalized random matchings: weak preferences,
weak priorities, unacceptability, and different num-
bers of agents and objects
We now further generalize the model and consider the setting where there is a set of n agents
N = {1, . . . , n} (in lexicographic order 1, . . . , n) and a set of m objects O = {o1, . . . , om}
(in lexicographic order o1, . . . , om) where m can be less than, equal to, or more than n.
We also now allow the agents and objects to partition the other side into acceptable and
unacceptable entities. An agent / object would rather be unmatched than to be matched to
an unacceptable object / agent. As in Section 2.3, preferences and priorities can be weak.
We still assume that agents would like to consume (up to) one object, but with different
numbers of agents and objects and taking acceptability into account we relax the notion of
a random matching as follows. A generalized random matching p is a n × m matrix
[p(i, o)]i∈N,o∈O such that
for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O, p(i, o) ≥ 0. (14)
for each i ∈ N,
∑
o∈O
p(i, o) ≤ 1, and (15)
for each o ∈ O,
∑
i∈N
p(i, o) ≤ 1. (16)
Hence, a random matching is a special case of a generalized random matching. A generalized
random matching p is deterministic if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O, p(i, o) ∈ {0, 1}.
Each generalized random matching can be represented as a convex combination of gen-
eralized deterministic matchings. The statement follows from the fact that every doubly
substochastic matrix is a finite convex combination of partial permutation matrices (Horn,
1986, Section 3.2, pp. 164-165). Kojima and Manea (2010) also give an explicit argument
for the same statement in Proposition 1 of their paper. A decomposition of a generalized
random matching p into generalized deterministic matchings Pj (j ∈ {1, . . . , k}) equals a
sum p =
∑k
j=1 λjPj such that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, λj ∈ (0, 1] and
∑k
j=1 λj = 1.
At a generalized deterministic matching, it can now happen that an agent gets no object
at all or that an object is not assigned to any agent. We now adjust the no envy definition
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to take the first of these issues into account when defining no envy.
Definition 14 (No envy for generalized deterministic matchings). A generalized
deterministic matching p has no envy if there exists no agent i who is matched to object
o′ or does not receive an object but prefers object o while object o is matched to some
agent j with lower priority than i, i.e., there exist no i, j ∈ N and no o ∈ O such that∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) = 0 (agent i does not receive o or any better object), p(j, o) = 1, and i ≻o j.
Two additional properties for generalized random matchings will play an important role.
The first is a minimal efficiency requirement that assures that no agents would rather like
to obtain a higher probability for any object that isn’t (fully) allocated.
Definition 15 (Non-wastefulness). A generalized random matching p is non-wasteful
if there is no acceptable pair (i, o) ∈ N ×O,
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1 (i would like to have more
of o), and
∑
j∈N p(j, o) < 1 (o is not fully allocated).
Note that in our previous model, non-wastefulness was built into the definition of a
random matching. Furthermore, the role of agents and objects in the definitions of no envy
and non-wastefulness is not symmetric.
The second property is a voluntary participation property that ensures that no agent /
object is ever matched to an unacceptable object / agent (not even partially).
Definition 16 (Individual rationality). A generalized random matching p is individu-
ally rational if for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such that at least one of i and o considers the
other unacceptable it follows that p(i, o) = 0.
Since in our previous models all agents / objects were acceptable, individual rationality
was automatically satisfied. We differ a bit in our terminology from Wu and Roth (2016) in
that we do not include individual rationality in our definition of no envy.
Next we show that any “general instance” with an unequal number of agents and objects
and with unacceptability can be transformed into an “associated instance” in which the
number of agents and objects is equal and all entities are acceptable. The purpose of this
approach is to obtain a better understanding of our general model in connection with the base
model and to show how almost all our stability concepts are preserved by that transformation
(in fact, all but one of the stability concepts are even equivalent under our transformation).
This approach will also be crucial in establishing a taxonomy of stability concepts for the
general model (see Figure 4).
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To formalize a general instance, let the empty set ∅ symbolize the so called null object
which stands for being unmatched (or possibly an outside option). All objects / agents that
are ranked above the null object are acceptable and all objects / agents ranked below are
unacceptable. We now assume that agents’ preferences and objects’ priorities are weak
orders over O∪{∅} and N ∪ {∅} respectively. Furthermore, no object is indifferent with the
null object for any agent and no agent has the same priority as the null object for any object,
i.e., for each pair (i, o) ∈ N × O, [either o ≻i ∅ or ∅ ≻i o] and [either i ≻o ∅ or ∅ ≻o i]. A
general instance is denoted by the set of agents, the set of objects and the corresponding
preferences and priorities: I = (N,O,%). If at a general instance all agents and objects are
acceptable, then the null object is the least preferred entity in all preferences and priorities.
Our model does include so called school choice instances as special cases: the set of
agents equals a set of students, the set of objects equals a set of school seats where each
school provides a fixed capacity of seats, students strictly rank schools but don’t care which
seat at a school they are matched to, and each school seat is allocated with the priority
of the associated school (recent surveys on school choice are Abdulkadirog˘lu, 2013; Pathak,
2011).
Next, we introduce a transformation from any general instance to an instance in which
the number of agents and objects is equal and all entities are acceptable and such that almost
all our stability concepts are preserved / equivalent under the transformation.
Transforming an instance with unequal number of agents and objects and with
unacceptability to one in which the number of agents and objects is equal and
all entities are acceptable: Consider a general instance I = (N,O,%). Then, we can
transform I into an associated instance I ′ = (N ′, O′,%′) of the standard setting with
weak preferences and weak priorities (Section 2.3) where |N ′| = |O′| and all objects and
agents are acceptable as follows.
N ′ = N ∪D (17)
where D = {d1, . . . , dm} is a set of dummy agents (in lexicographic order d1, . . . , dm).
O′ = O ∪ Φ (18)
where Φ = {φ1, . . . , φn} is a set of null objects (in lexicographic order φ1, . . . , φn).
Note that |N ′| = |O′| = n+m.
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Next, we extend preferences / priorities from the general instance I to the associated
instance I ′ as follows. For any subset B of N or O, we denote the restriction of preference
/ priority of agent / object α, %α, to set B by %α (B). Furthermore, for any subset B
of set N , D, O, or Φ, we denote the lexicographic order of B by lex(B). The main idea
of extending preferences and priorities from general instance I to associated instance I ′ is
that each agent i ∈ N has a default personal null object φi that is less preferred than all
acceptable objects, more preferred than all the unacceptable objects, and that ranks agent
i as its highest priority agent. Furthermore, each object oj ∈ O has a default personal
dummy agent dj who has lower priority than all the acceptable agents, higher priority than
all unacceptable agents, and who most prefers object oj.
Each agent i ∈ N extends his preferences %i by replacing the null object ∅ by the set of null
objects Φ such that agent i’s null object φi is more preferred than all other null objects (in
strict lexicographic order) - each comma below indicates strict preferences at %′i:
%′i=%i ({o ∈ O : o ≻i ∅}) , φi, lex (Φ \ {φi}) , %i ({o ∈ O : ∅ ≻i o)}). (19)
Each object oj ∈ O extends its priorities by replacing the null object ∅ by the set of dummy
agents D such that object oj’s dummy agent dj is more preferred than all other dummy
agents (in strict lexicographic order) - each comma below indicates strict priorities at %′oj :
%′oj=%oj
(
{i ∈ N : i ≻oj ∅}
)
, dj, lex (D \ {dj}) , %oj
(
{i ∈ N : ∅ ≻oj i}
)
. (20)
Each dummy agent dj first prefers object oj , then all other objects in O \ {oj} (in strict
lexicographic order), and finally dummy agent dj ranks the null objects in Φ exactly as
object oj ranks the agents in N , i.e., for all i, k ∈ N , φi %
′
dj
φk if and only if i %oj k - each
comma below indicates strict preferences at %′dj :
%′dj= oj, lex (O \ {oj}) , %
′
dj
(Φ). (21)
Each null object φi first ranks agent i as the highest priority agent, then all the other agents
in N \ {i} (in strict lexicographic order), and finally null object φi ranks the dummy agents
in D exactly as agent i ranks the objects in O, i.e., for all oj, ok ∈ O, dj %
′
φi
dk if and only
if oj %i ok - each comma below indicates strict priorities at %
′
φi
:
%′φi= i, lex(N \ {i}), %
′
φi
(D). (22)
29
Consider a generalized random matching p for a general instance I = (N,O,%). Then, we
defined the associated random matching p′ for instance I ′ = (N ′, O′,%′) as follows:
• for each pair (i, oj) ∈ N ×O, p
′(i, oj) = p(i, oj) ,
• for each pair (dj, φi) ∈ D × Φ, p
′(dj, φi) = p(i, oj),
• for each pair (i, φi) ∈ N × Φ, p
′(i, φi) = 1−
∑
o∈O p(i, o),
• for each pair (dj, oj) ∈ D ×O, p
′(dj , oj) = 1−
∑
i∈N p(i, oj), and
• for all remaining pairs (a, b) ∈ (N ∪D)× (O ∪ Φ), p′(a, b) = 0.
The associated random matching p′ looks as follows:
o1 . . . om φ1 . . . φn



1 p(1, o1) . . . p(1, om) | p(1, ∅) 0
.
.
.
...
... |
. . .
n p(n, o1) . . . p(n, om) | 0 p(n, ∅)
— — — — — — —
d1 p(∅, o1) 0 | p(1, o1) . . . p(n, o1)
.
.
.
. . . |
...
...
dm 0 p(∅, om) | p(1, om) . . . p(n, om)
where
• for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, p(i, ∅) := 1−
∑
o∈O p(i, o) and
• for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, p(∅, oj) := 1−
∑
i∈N p(i, oj).
Definition 17 (Associated random matching p′ respecting non-wastefulness). Let p
be a generalized random matching and p′ its associated random matching. Then, p′ respects
non-wastefulness (of p) if p is non-wasteful; i.e., there is no acceptable pair (i, oj) ∈ N × O
such that [
∑
o′:o′%ioj
p′(i, o′) < 1 and
∑
j∈N p
′(j, oj) < 1].
Definition 18 (Associated random matching p′ respecting individual rationality).
Let p be a generalized random matching and p′ its associated random matching. Then, p′
respects individual rationality (of p) if p is individually rational; i.e., for any unacceptable
pair (i, oj) ∈ N × O, p
′(i, oj) = p(i, oj) = 0 and p
′(dj, φi) = p(i, oj) = 0.
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Example 2 (Transforming a general instance and a generalized random matching).
Consider the following general instance I = (N,O,≻) with strict preferences and strict
priorities: N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {x, y},
≻1: x y ∅
≻2: y x ∅
≻3: x ∅ y
≻x: 2 3 1 ∅
≻y: 1 2 ∅ 3
and the generalized random matching
p =


1/3 1/2
0 1/2
2/3 0

 .
The associated instance equals I ′ = (N ′, O′,≻′) with strict preferences and strict priorities
such that N ′ = {1, 2, 3, dx, dy}, O
′ = {a, b, φ1, φ2, φ3}, and
≻′1: x y φ1 φ2 φ3
≻′2: y x φ2 φ1 φ3
≻′3: x φ3 φ1 φ2 y
≻′dx : x y φ2 φ3 φ1
≻′dy : y x φ1 φ2 φ3
≻′x: 2 3 1 dx dy
≻′y: 1 2 dy dx 3
≻′φ1 : 1 2 3 dx dy
≻′φ2 : 2 1 3 dy dx
≻′φ3 : 3 1 2 dx dy.
The associated random matching equals
p′ =
x y φ1 φ2 φ3



1 1/3 1/2 | 1/6 0 0
2 0 1/2 | 0 1/2 0
3 2/3 0 | 0 0 1/3
— — — — — —
dx 0 0 | 1/3 0 2/3
dy 0 0 | 1/2 1/2 0
.
⋄
In the sequel, whenever preferences and priorities are strict, then weak stability (Defini-
tion 8) can be simply referred to as stability. The reason why we need to be more careful in
terminology when preferences and priorities are weak is the fact that we use strict blocking
when defining weak stability while other blocking notions are theoretically also possible (see
also Section 2.3).
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Next, we show that for each generalized deterministic matching p, no envy, individual
rationality, and non-wastefulness are equivalent to weak stability of the associated determin-
istic matching p′.
Proposition 20. The generalized deterministic matching p has no envy and is individually
rational and non-wasteful if and only if the associated deterministic matching p′ is weakly
stable.
Proof. Part 1: Let p be a generalized deterministic matching and p′ its associated de-
terministic matching. We first show that p being individually irrational, or wasteful, or
having envy implies that p′ is not weakly stable. We do so via the following table that for
any of the possible violations for p lists an associated no-envy violation for p′. In Table 1,
(i, oj) ∈ N × O:
Table 1: Violations for p and associated no-envy violation for p′.
IIR = individually irrational, W = wasteful, E = envy.
violation for p associated no-envy violation for p′
IIR agent i’s match is an unacceptable object: E agent i envies dj for φi:
p(i, oj) = 1 and ∅ ≻i oj p
′(i, oj) = 1, p
′(dj, φi) = 1,
φi ≻
′
i oj , i ≻
′
φi
dj
IIR object oj’s match is an unacceptable agent: E agent dj envies i for oj:
p(i, oj) = 1 and ∅ ≻oj i p
′(i, oj) = 1, p
′(dj, φi) = 1,
oj ≻
′
dj
φi, dj ≻
′
oj
i
W agent i gets ∅ and wants unassigned object oj: E agent i envies dj for oj:
i ≻oj ∅, oj ≻i ∅, p
′(i, φi) = 1, p
′(dj, oj) = 1,∑
l∈N p(l, o) = 0,
∑
o′∈O p(i, o
′) = 0 oj ≻
′
i φi, i ≻
′
oj
dj
W agent i gets o′ and wants unassigned object oj : E agent i envies dj for oj:
i ≻oj ∅, oj ≻i ∅, p
′(i, o′) = 1, p′(dj, oj) = 1,∑
l∈N p(l, o) = 0, p(i, o
′) = 1 oj ≻
′
i o
′, i ≻′oj dj
E agent i gets o′ and envies k for oj : E agent i envies k for oj:
p(i, o′) = 1, p(k, oj) = 1, p
′(i, o′) = 1, p′(k, oj) = 1,
oj ≻i o
′, i ≻oj k oj ≻
′
i o
′, i ≻′oj k
E agent i gets ∅ and envies k for oj: E agent i envies k for oj:∑
o′∈O p(i, o
′) = 0, p(k, oj) = 1, p
′(i, φi) = 1, p
′(k, oj) = 1,
oj ≻i ∅, i ≻oj k oj ≻
′
i φi, i ≻
′
oj
k
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Part 2: We show that p′ not being weakly stable implies that p is individually irrational,
or wasteful, or has envy, or that the weak stability violation at p′ was not possible. Assume
that at p′ some agent a envies an agent b for object c. Then, p′(a, d) = 1, p′(b, c), c ≻′a d, and
a ≻′c b. Depending on the specifications of a, b, c, and d, different violations can be identified
for p. The following tables list all no-envy violations for p′ and for p associates individual
irrationality, wastefulness, or envy (Table 2) or explains why the no-envy violations of p′
cannot occur given its definition (Table 3). Note that since (a, d), (b, c) ∈ {N × O,N ×
Φ, D × O,D × Φ} we have in total 16 different cases to discuss.
Table 2: No-envy violations for p′ and associated violation for p.
IIR = individually irrational, W = wasteful, E = envy.
no-envy violation for p′ associated violation for p
E agent a envies agent b for c: E agent i envies agent j for o:
(a, d), (b, c) ∈ N × O,
(a, d) = (i, o′), (b, c) = (j, o),
p′(i, o′) = 1, p′(j, o) = 1, p(i, o′) = 1, p(j, o) = 1,
o ≻′i o
′, i ≻′o j. o ≻i o
′, i ≻o j.
E agent a envies agent b for c: agent i is individually irrational
(a, d) ∈ N ×O, (b, c) ∈ D ×O, or object o is wasted:
(a, d) = (i, o′), (b, c) = (dj, oj),
p′(i, o′) = 1, p′(dj, oj) = 1, p(i, o
′) = 1,
∑
k∈N p(k, oj) = 0,
oj ≻
′
i o
′, i ≻′oj dj, oj ≻i o
′, i ≻oj ∅,
(a) φi ≻
′
i oj, (a) IIR ∅ ≻i oj ,
(b) oj ≻
′
i φi. (b) W oj ≻i ∅.
E agent a envies agent b for c: IIR agent i is individually irrational:
(a, d) ∈ N ×O, (b, c) ∈ D × Φ,
(a, d) = (i, o′), (b, c) = (dj, φk),
in particular, p′(i, o′) = 1, φk ≻
′
i o
′. p(i, o′) = 1, ∅ ≻i o
′.
E agent a envies agent b for c: W object oj is wasted:
(a, d) ∈ N × Φ, (b, c) ∈ D ×O,
(a, d) = (i, φi), (b, c) = (dj, oj),
p′(i, φi) = 1, p
′(dj , oj) = 1,
∑
o′∈O p(i, o
′) = 0,
∑
k∈N p(k, oj) = 0,
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oj ≻
′
i φi, i ≻
′
oj
dj . oj ≻i ∅, i ≻oj ∅.
E agent a envies agent b for c: E agent l envies agent k for oi:
(a, d), (b, c) ∈ D × Φ,
(a, d) = (di, φk), (b, c) = (dj, φl),
p′(di, φk) = 1, p
′(dj, φl) = 1, p(k, oi) = 1, p(l, oj) = 1,
φl ≻
′
di
φk, di ≻
′
φl
dj. l ≻oi k, oi ≻l oj.
E agent a envies agent b for c: JE agent i envies agent j for o:
(a, d) ∈ N × Φ, (b, c) ∈ N ×O,
(a, d) = (i, φi), (b, c) = (j, o),
p′(i, φi) = 1, p
′(j, o) = 1,
∑
o′:o′%o p(i, o
′) = 0, p(j, o) = 1,
o ≻′i φi, i ≻
′
o j. o ≻i ∅, i ≻o j.
E agent a envies agent b for c: IIR object o is individually irrational:
(a, d) ∈ D ×O, (b, c) ∈ N ×O,
(a, d) = (di, oi), (b, c) = (j, o),
in particular, p′(j, o) = 1, di ≻
′
o j. p(j, o) = 1, ∅ ≻o j.
E agent a envies agent b for c: IIR object o is individually irrational:
(a, d) ∈ D × Φ, (b, c) ∈ N ×O,
(a, d) = (di, φk), (b, c) = (j, o),
in particular, p′(j, o) = 1, di ≻
′
o j. p(j, o) = 1, ∅ ≻o j.
Table 3: No-envy violations of p′ that are not possible.
E = envy, IP = impossibility.
no-envy violation for p′ why this no-envy violation for p′ is not possible
E agent a envies agent b for c:
(a, d) ∈ N ×O, (b, c) ∈ N × Φ, IP i ≻′φj j is not possible
(a, d) = (i, o′), (b, c) = (j, φj), because by the definition of p
′,
in particular, i ≻′φj j. j ≻
′
φj
i.
E agent a envies agent b for c:
(a, d) ∈ N × Φ, (b, c) ∈ N × Φ, IP φj ≻
′
i φi is not possible
(a, d) = (i, φi), (b, c) = (j, φj), because by the definition of p
′,
in particular, φj ≻
′
i φi. φi ≻
′
i φj.
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E agent a envies agent b for c:
(a, d) ∈ N × Φ, (b, c) ∈ D × Φ, IP φk ≻
′
i φi is not possible
(a, d) = (i, φi), (b, c) = (dj, φk), because by the definition of p
′,
in particular, φk ≻
′
i φi. φi ≻
′
i φk.
E agent a envies agent b for c:
(a, d) ∈ D × O, (b, c) ∈ D × O, IP oj ≻
′
di
oi is not possible
(a, d) = (di, oi), (b, c) = (dj, oj), because by the definition of p
′,
in particular, oj ≻
′
di
oi. oi ≻
′
di
oj.
E agent a envies agent b for c:
(a, d) ∈ D × O, (b, c) ∈ D × Φ, IP φk ≻
′
di
oi is not possible
(a, d) = (di, oi), (b, c) = (dj, φk), because by the definition of p
′,
in particular, φk ≻
′
di
oi. oi ≻
′
di
φk.
E agent a envies agent b for c:
(a, d) ∈ D × O, (b, c) ∈ N × Φ, IP φj ≻
′
di
oi is not possible
(a, d) = (di, oi), (b, c) = (j, φj), because by the definition of p
′,
in particular, φj ≻
′
di
oi. oi ≻
′
di
φj.
E agent a envies agent b for c:
(a, d) ∈ D × Φ, (b, c) ∈ N × Φ, IP di ≻
′
φj
j is not possible
(a, d) = (di, φk), (b, c) = (j, φj), because by the definition of p
′,
in particular, di ≻
′
φj
j. j ≻′φj di.
E agent a envies agent b for c:
(a, d) ∈ D × Φ, (b, c) ∈ D × O, IP di ≻
′
oj
dj is not possible
(a, d) = (di, φk), (b, c) = (dj, oj), because by the definition of p
′,
in particular, di ≻
′
oj
dj. dj ≻
′
oj
di.
Example 3 (No-envy, individual rationality, and non-wastefulness are logically
independent). Consider the following general instance I = (N,O,≻) with strict preferences
and strict priorities: N = {1, 2}, O = {x, y},
≻1: x ∅ y
≻2: x y ∅
≻x: 2 1 ∅
≻y: 1 2 ∅
and the generalized deterministic matchings
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p1 =
(
0 0
0 0
)
, p2 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, p3 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, p4 =
(
0 0
1 0
)
.
Then, p1 has no envy, is individually rational, but it is wasteful; p2 has no envy, is non-
wasteful, but it is individually irrational; p3 is individually rational, non-wasteful, but it has
envy; p4 is the only generalized deterministic matching for this instance that has no envy, is
individually rational, and is non-wasteful. ⋄
The classic definition of weak stability for generalized deterministic matchings in our
model is the following.
Definition 19 (Weak stability for generalized deterministic matchings). A general-
ized deterministic matching p is weakly stable if it is individually rational and there exist
no agent and no object that would prefer each other to their current match, i.e., there exists
no pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such that
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) = 0 (agent i would like to have o) and∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) = 0 (object o would like to be matched to i).
The well-known deferred-acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) computes a gen-
eralized deterministic matching that is weakly stable.
Whenever preferences and priorities are strict, then weak stability (Definition 19) can be
simply referred to as stability. It is easy to check that the following now holds.
Proposition 21. A generalized deterministic matching is weakly stable if and only if it is
individually rational, non-wasteful, and has no envy.
Proof. Let p be a generalized deterministic matching that is individually rational. Assume
p is weakly stable, i.e., there exists no pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such that
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) = 0
and
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) = 0. Since p is deterministic, this is equivalent to there being no pair
(i, o) ∈ N ×O such that
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) = 0 and (a)
∑
j∈N p(j, o) = 0 or (b) for some agent
j ∈ N , i ≻o j and p(j, o) = 1. This in turn is equivalent to p being (a) non-wasteful and (b)
having no envy.
Propositions 20 and 21 now imply the following (see Figure 3).
Proposition 22. A generalized deterministic matching p is weakly stable if and only if the
associated deterministic matching p′ is weakly stable.
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Propositions 20, 21, and 22: For any generalized deterministic matching p and its
associated deterministic matching p′, we have
no envy,
p non-wastefulness,
individual rationality
(Defs. 14, 15, and 16)
no envy
p′ = weakly stable
(Def. 8)
p weakly stable
(Def. 19)
Prop. 20
Prop. 22
Prop. 21
Figure 3: Relations between weak stability, no envy, individual rationality, and non-
wastefulness for generalized deterministic matchings.
By Proposition 21, a generalized deterministic matching p is weakly stable if it is indi-
vidually rational, non-wasteful, and has no envy. Recall that no envy implies that there
exist no i, j ∈ N and no o ∈ O such that
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) = 0, p(j, o) = 1, and i ≻o j. The
latter is equivalent to the following inequalities being satisfied:10 for each acceptable pair
(i, o) ∈ N ×O,
p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o) ≥ 1. (23)
We now adapt all previous stability concepts introduced in Section 2.3 to generalized
random matchings. First, we adjust the property of no ex-ante envy to generalized random
matchings.
Definition 20 (No ex-ante envy for generalized random matchings). A generalized
random matching p has no ex-ante envy if there exists no agent i who prefers a higher prob-
ability for object o while object o is matched with positive probability to some agent j with
lower priority than i, i.e., there exist no i, j ∈ N and no o ∈ O such that
∑
o′:o′%o p(i, o
′) < 1
(agent i would like to have more of o), p(j, o) > 0 (agent j has some of o), o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j.
10For instances with strict preferences and strict priorities, this characterization of stable matchings is due
to Rothblum (1992) (see also Roth et al., 1993).
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For generalized random matchings the definition of Aharoni-Fleiner fractional stability
(Definition 5) remains the same and its equivalence to no ex-ante envy follows as before.
Next, for each generalized random matching p, no ex-ante envy, individual rationality, and
non-wastefulness are equivalent to ex-ante weak stability of the associated random match-
ing p′.
Proposition 23. The generalized random matching p has no ex-ante envy and is individually
rational and non-wasteful if and only if the associated random matching p′ is ex-ante weakly
stable.
Proof. The proof follows exactly along the lines of the proof of Proposition 20. The only
difference is that in that proof no envy, individual rationality, non-wastefulness, and weak
stability all are defined for probabilities 1 and 0 to receive an object and when we now consider
no ex-ante envy, individual rationality, non-wastefulness, and ex-ante weak stability, these
definitions pertain to any probability of receiving an object: all arguments that were using
an agent receiving an object with probability 1 now apply for an agent receiving a positive
probability of that object.
Ex-ante weak stability for generalized random matchings is naturally defined as follows.
Definition 21 (Ex-ante weak stability for generalized random matchings). A gener-
alized random matching p is ex-ante weakly stable if it is individually rational and there
exist no agent and no object that would prefer a higher probability for each other, i.e., there
exist no pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such that
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1 (agent i would like to have more
of o) and
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) < 1 (object o would like to be matched more to i).
It is easy to check that the following now holds.
Proposition 24. A generalized random matching is ex-ante weakly stable if and only if it
has no ex-ante envy and it is individually rational and non-wasteful.
Proof. Let p be a generalized random matching that is individually rational. Assume p is
ex-ante weakly stable, i.e., there exists no pair (i, o) ∈ N ×O such that
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1
and
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) < 1. This is equivalent to there being no pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such that∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1 and (a)
∑
j∈N p(j, o) < 1 or (b) for some agent j ∈ N , i ≻o j and
p(j, o) > 0. This in turn is equivalent to p being (a) non-wasteful and (b) having no ex-ante
envy.
38
Propositions 23 and 24 now imply the following (see the top part of Figure 4).
Proposition 25. The generalized random matching p is ex-ante weakly stable if and only if
the associated random matching p′ is ex-ante weakly stable.
Next, we adjust the properties of ex-post weak stability and robust ex-post weak stability
to generalized random matchings.
Recall that each generalized random matching can be represented as a convex combi-
nation of generalized deterministic matchings. We now establish three results concerning
the decomposition of an individually rational, respectively non-wasteful, generalized random
matching.
Lemma 5. A generalized random matching is individually rational if and only if in each of
its decompositions all generalized deterministic matchings are individually rational.
Proof. Part 1: Suppose that generalized random matching p is individually irrational.
Then, for some (i, o) ∈ N × O, p(i, o) > 0 and agent i or object o considers the other
unacceptable. Then, in any decomposition of p into generalized deterministic matchings,
there exists a generalized deterministic matching q such that q(i, o) = 1 and q is individually
irrational.
Part 2: Suppose that at some decomposition of p there exists an individually irrational
generalized deterministic matching q, i.e., for some (i, o) ∈ N × O, q(i, o) = 1 and agent
i or object o considers the other unacceptable. Then, p(i, o) > 0 and p is individually
irrational.
Lemma 6. If a generalized random matching is non-wasteful, then in each of its decompo-
sitions all generalized deterministic matchings are non-wasteful.
Proof. Suppose that at some decomposition of p there exists a wasteful generalized de-
terministic matching q, i.e., there exists an acceptable pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such that∑
o′:o′%io
q(i, o′) = 0 (i would like to have object o) and
∑
j∈N q(j, o) = 0 (object o is not
allocated). Then it follows that
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1 and
∑
j∈N p(j, o) < 1. Hence, p is
wasteful.
The following example shows that the converse statement in Lemma 6 does not hold.
Example 4 (A wasteful generalized random matching that can be decomposed
into generalized deterministic (non-wasteful) weakly stable matchings). Consider
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the following general instance I = (N,O,%) with strict preferences and weak priorities (the
brackets indicate indifferences): N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {x, y, z},
%1: x y z ∅
%2: z y x ∅
%3: x y ∅ z
%x: [1 3] 2 ∅
%y: 2 1 ∅ 3
%z: 1 2 3 ∅
Consider the generalized random matching
p =


1/2 0 1/2
0 1/2 1/2
1/2 0 0


and note that it is wasteful: agent 1 would like to have more of object y that is not fully
allocated. However, matching p can be decomposed into two generalized deterministic non-
wasteful and weakly stable matchings as follows:
p =
1
2
q1 +
1
2
q2
where
q1 =


1 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 0


and
q2 =


0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0

 .
Note that q1 and q2 are non-wasteful and weakly stable: at q1 both agents 1 and 2 are matched
to their most preferred objects and the unassigned object y finds agent 3 unacceptable;
agent 3 cannot block with x since x has maximal priority for agent 1 and agent 3 cannot
block with z since z has higher priority for agent 2. At q2 objects y and z will not block
because they are matched respectively to their highest priority agents; agent 1 would like to
block with x but x has maximal priority for agent 3. ⋄
Example 4 illustrates why in the next two definitions it is important to add non-
wastefulness.
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Definition 22 (Ex-post weak stability for generalized random matchings). A gen-
eralized random matching p is ex-post weakly stable if it is non-wasteful and can be
decomposed into generalized deterministic weakly stable matchings.
Definition 23 (Robust ex-post weak stability for generalized random matchings).
A generalized random matching p is robust ex-post weakly stable if it is non-wasteful
and all of its decompositions are into generalized deterministic weakly stable matchings.
We have the following equivalences for ex-post weak stability and robust ex-post weak
stability for generalized random matchings and their associated random matchings.
Proposition 26. The generalized random matching p is ex-post weakly stable if and only if
the associated random matching p′ is ex-post weakly stable and respects non-wastefulness.
Proof. Let p be a generalized random matching and p′ its associated random matching.
Part 1: Let p be an ex-post weakly stable generalized matching. Recall that the non-
wastefulness of p is equivalent to p′ respecting non-wastefulness. Furthermore, p can be
decomposed into generalized deterministic weakly stable matchings. By Proposition 22,
each generalized deterministic weakly stable matching in the decomposition corresponds to
an associated deterministic weakly stable matching. The induced decomposition consisting
of the associated deterministic weakly stable matchings is a decomposition of the associated
random matching p′. Hence, p′ is ex-post weakly stable.
Part 2: Recall that from any associated random matching p′ we can obtain the original
generalized random matching p by taking its first n rows and its first m columns (|N | = n
and |O| = m). Let the associated random matching p′ of p be ex-post weakly stable and
respect non-wastefulness. Then, p′ can be decomposed into deterministic weakly stable
matchings. Note that by taking the first n rows and the first m columns of each of the
deterministic weakly stable matchings in the decomposition, we can derive a decomposition
of p into generalized deterministic weakly stable matchings (Proposition 22). Furthermore,
since p′ respects non-wastefulness, p is non-wasteful. Hence, p is ex-post weakly stable.
Proposition 27. The generalized random matching p is robust ex-post weakly stable if and
only if the associated random matching p′ is robust ex-post weakly stable and respects non-
wastefulness.
Proof. Let p be a generalized random matching and p′ its associated random matching.
By Proposition 26, p is ex-post weakly stable if and only if p′ is ex-post weakly stable and
respects non-wastefulness.
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Part 1: Let p be an ex-post weakly stable generalized matching that is not robust ex-post
weakly stable. Hence, p has a decomposition into generalized deterministic matchings that is
not weakly stable, i.e., at least one of the generalized deterministic matchings in the decom-
position is not weakly stable. By Proposition 22, each generalized deterministic matching in
the decomposition corresponds to an associated deterministic matching and the weakly un-
stable generalized deterministic matching leads to a weakly unstable associated deterministic
matching. The induced decomposition consisting of the associated deterministic matchings
is a decomposition of the associated random matching p′. Hence, p′ has a decomposition into
deterministic matchings that are not all weakly stable and p′ is not robust ex-post weakly
stable.
Part 2: Recall that from any associated random matching p′ we can obtain the original
generalized random matching p by taking its first n rows and its first m columns (|N | = n
and |O| = m). Let the associated random matching p′ of p respect non-wastefulness and be
ex-post weakly stable but not robust ex-post weakly stable. Hence, p′ has a decomposition
into deterministic matchings that is not weakly stable, i.e., at least one of the deterministic
matchings in the decomposition is not weakly stable. Note that by taking the first n rows
and the first m columns of each of the deterministic matchings in the decomposition, we
can derive a decomposition of p into generalized deterministic matchings and the weakly
unstable associated deterministic matching leads to a weakly unstable generalized determin-
istic matching (Proposition 22). The induced decomposition consisting of the generalized
deterministic matchings is a decomposition of the generalized random matching p. Hence, p
has a decomposition into generalized deterministic matchings that are not all weakly stable
and p is not robust ex-post weakly stable.
Next, we adjust the properties of fractional weak stability and claimwise weak stability
to generalized random matchings.
Fractional weak stability is again obtained by relaxing the “integer solution requirement”
for the inequalities that define weak stability for generalized deterministic matchings (23).
Given a generalized random matching p and an object o, recall that by p(∅, o) we denote the
amount of object o that is unassigned, i.e., p(∅, o) = 1−
∑
i∈N p(i, o).
Definition 24 (Fractional weak stability and violations of fractional weak stability
for generalized random matchings). A generalized random matching p is fractionally
weakly stable if p is individually rational, non-wasteful, and for each acceptable pair (i, o) ∈
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N ×O,
p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o) ≥ 1, (23)
or more compactly, ∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) ≥
∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o) + p(∅, o). (24)
A violation of fractional weak stability occurs if there exists a pair (i, o) ∈ N ×O such
that ∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o) + p(∅, o) >
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′). (25)
Inequality (25) implies
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1, i.e., agent i receives some fraction of an
object in his strict lower contour set at o or i is not fully matched (if not, this would imply
that
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) + p(i, o) = 1 and hence,
∑
j:j≺oi
p(j, o) + p(∅, o) + p(i, o) > 1; a
contradiction). Thus, agent i would want to consume more of object o. Inequality (25)
also implies
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) < 1, i.e., object o receives some fraction of an agent in its strict
lower contour set at i or o is not fully allocated. Thus, object o would want to consume
more of agent i. Moreover, strict inequality (25) encodes the following envy notion: using
consumption process language, as long as agent i consumes objects that are different and not
worse than o he does not envy the set of lower priority agents to jointly consume fractions
of o and he does not mind fractions of o to be unassigned, however, once the unassigned
amounts of o plus the amounts lower priority agents have consumed reach agent i’s weak
upper contour set at o (not including o), agent i starts either having envy or complaining
about wastefulness (unless agent i can fill his remaining probability quota with object o).
Remark 4 (A symmetric reformulation of fractional weak stability for generalized
random matchings and its violations). In the definition of fractional weak stability for
generalized random matchings by inequalities (24) and of a violation of fractional weak
stability for generalized random matchings by inequality (25) we have taken the viewpoint
of an agent who considers the consumptions of lower priority agents for an object and the
amount of the object that is unassigned. The symmetric formulations when taking the
viewpoint of an object that “considers” the matches of lower preferred objects to an agent
and the amount of an agent he is not matched at are as follows. Given a generalized random
matching p and an agent i, recall that by p(i, ∅) we denote the amount of agent i that is
not matched, i.e., p(i, ∅) = 1 −
∑
o∈O p(i, o). Then, a generalized random matching p is
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fractionally weakly stable if for each acceptable pair (i, o) ∈ N × O,
∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o) ≥
∑
o′:o′≺io
p(i, o′) + p(i, ∅). (24’)
We can write a violation of fractional weak stability as, there exists an acceptable pair
(i, o) ∈ N ×O such that
∑
o′:o′≺io
p(i, o′) + p(i, ∅) >
∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o). (25’)
⋄
Interestingly, if preferences and priorities are strict, then inequalities (23) imply non-
wastefulness.
Proposition 28. Let p be an individually rational generalized random matching such that
for each acceptable pair (i, o) ∈ N × O,
p(i, o) +
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) +
∑
j:j%oi;j 6=i
p(j, o) ≥ 1.
If preferences and priorities are strict, then p satisfies non-wastefulness.
Proof. Roth et al. (1993) show that in the general model with strict preferences and prior-
ities, any individually rational generalized random matching satisfying inequalities (23) can
be decomposed into non-wasteful and stable generalized deterministic matchings. On top
of that, the rural hospital theorem (Roth, 1986) implies that the set of matched agents and
objects is always the same in all stable generalized deterministic matchings. Now suppose,
by contradiction, that a convex combination of non-wasteful and stable generalized determin-
istic matchings q1, . . . , qm leads to a wasteful generalized random matching p. By definition
of wastefulness, there is an acceptable pair (i, o) ∈ N × O such that
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1 (i
would like to have more of o) and
∑
j∈N p(j, o) < 1 (o is not fully allocated). Then, the
object o that is wasted at generalized random matching p is not assigned to any agent in
at least one of the generalized deterministic stable matchings qj in the convex combination.
Thus, by the rural hospital theorem, o is not assigned to any agent in any stable general-
ized deterministic matching in {q1, . . . , qm}. Since
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1, it follows that in
at least one of the stable generalized deterministic matchings qk,
∑
o′:o′%io
qk(i, o′) = 0 and∑
j∈N q
k(j, o) = 0. Hence, qk is wasteful; a contradiction.
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A statement along the lines of Proposition 28 is not true anymore when preferences and
priorities can be weak, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 5 (A wasteful and individually rational generalized random matching
that satisfies inequalities (23)). Consider the following general instance I = (N,O,%)
with weak preferences and weak priorities: N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {x, y, z},
%1: [x y] ∅ z
%2: [y z] ∅ x
%3: [x z] ∅ y
%x: [1 3] ∅ 2
%y: [1 2] ∅ 3
%z: [2 3] ∅ 1.
Then, the generalized random matching
p =


1/3 1/3 0
0 1/3 1/3
1/3 0 1/3


is wasteful, individually rational, and satisfies inequalities (23). ⋄
We have the following equivalence for fractional weak stability for generalized random
matchings and their associated random matchings.
Proposition 29. The generalized random matching p is fractionally weakly stable if and only
if the associated random matching p′ is fractionally stable and respects non-wastefulness.
Proof. Let p be a generalized random matching and p′ its associated random matching.
Part 1: Let p be a fractionally weakly stable generalized random matching. Thus, p is
non-wasteful, individually rational, and satisfies inequalities (23). Then, p′ respects non-
wastefulness and individual rationality. Suppose, by contradiction, that p′ is not fractionally
weakly stable. Then, for some pair (a, b) ∈ N ′ × O′,
∑
a′:a′≺′
b
a
p′(a′, b) >
∑
b′:b′%′ab;b
′ 6=b
p′(a, b′).
In particular, ∑
a′:a′≺′
b
a
p′(a′, b) > 0.
Furthermore, recall that
∑
b′:b′%′ab
p′(a, b′) < 1 and hence,
∑
b′:b′≺′ab
p′(a, b′) > 0.
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Case 1. Suppose that b = oj ∈ O. Recall that
%′oj=%oj
(
{k ∈ N : k ≻oj ∅}
)
, dj, lex (D \ {dj}) , %oj
(
{k ∈ N : ∅ ≻oj k}
)
.
By the definition of %′ and p′ and individual rationality (of p), for all dk ∈ D \ {dj},
p′(dk, oj) = 0 and for all l ∈ N such that l ≺oj ∅, p
′(l, oj) = 0. Thus, if a -
′
oj
dj , then∑
a′:a′≺′oj
a p
′(a′, oj) = 0; a contradiction. Hence, a ≻
′
oj
dj and a = i ∈ N is an acceptable
agent. By a symmetric argument, starting with a = i ∈ N and
%′i=%i({o ∈ O : o ≻i ∅}) , φi, lex (Φ \ {φi}) , %i({o ∈ O : ∅ ≻i o}) ,
we obtain b ≻′i φi and that b = oj ∈ O is an acceptable object.
Then, by the definition of %′ and p′ (recall that p′(dj, oj) = p(∅, oj)),
i = a ≻′oj dj implies
∑
a′:a′≺′oj
i
p′(a′, oj) =
∑
k:k≺oj i
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj)
and
oj = b ≻
′
i φi implies
∑
b′:b′%′ioj ;b
′ 6=oj
p′(i, b′) =
∑
o′:o′%ioj ;o′ 6=oj
p(i, o′).
Hence, inequality
∑
a′:a′≺′
b
a p
′(a′, b) >
∑
b′:b′%′ab;b
′ 6=b p
′(a, b′) for a = i ∈ N and b = oj ∈ O can
be rewritten as ∑
k:k≺oj i
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj) >
∑
o′:o′%ioj ;o′ 6=oj
p(i, o′),
which contradicts that p was fractionally weakly stable.
Since in Case 1 we have shown that b ∈ O implies a ∈ N and vice versa, the only
remaining case to discuss is (a, b) ∈ D × Φ.
Case 2. Suppose that a = dj ∈ D and b = φi ∈ Φ. Recall that
%′dj= oj, lex (O \ {oj}) , %
′
dj
(Φ).
By the definition of %′dj and p
′, for all l, m ∈ N , φl %
′
dj
φm if and only if l %oj m and
p′(dj, oj) = p(∅, oj). Then, we have
∑
b′:b′%′
dj
φi;b′ 6=φi
p′(dj , b
′) =
∑
k:φk%
′
dj
φi;k 6=i
p′(dj, φk) + p
′(dj, oj) =
∑
k:k%oj i;k 6=i
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj).
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Next, recall that
%′φi= i, lex (N \ {i}) , %
′
φi
(D).
By the definition of %′φi , for all x, y ∈ O, dx %
′
φi
dy if and only if x %i y. Then, by the
definition of %′φi and p
′, we have
∑
a′:a′≺′
φi
dj
p′(a′, φi) =
∑
dl:dl≺
′
φi
dj
p′(dl, φi) =
∑
ol:ol≺ioj
p(i, ol).
Hence, inequality
∑
a′:a′≺′
b
a p
′(a′, b) >
∑
b′:b′%′ab;b
′ 6=b p
′(a, b′) for a = dj ∈ D and b = φi ∈ Φ
can be rewritten as ∑
ol:ol≺ioj
p(i, ol) >
∑
k:k%oj i;k 6=i
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj).
This implies
∑
ol:ol≺ioj
p(i, ol) > 0 and individual rationality implies that agent i finds ob-
ject oj acceptable. Similarly it follows that
∑
k:k%oj i;k 6=i
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj) < 1, therefore∑
k:k-oj i
p(k, oj) > 0, and by individual rationality, object oj finds agent i acceptable. Hence,
(i, oj) ∈ N × O is an acceptable pair. Furthermore, recall that
∑
b′:b′%′ab
p′(a, b′) < 1 and
hence,
∑
ol:ol%ioj
p(i, ol) < 1. Thus, by non-wastefulness, p(∅, oj) = 0. Therefore, for the
acceptable pair (i, oj) ∈ N × O,
∑
ol:ol≺ioj
p(i, ol) >
∑
k:k%oj i;k 6=i
p(k, oj)
and therefore also ∑
ol:ol≺ioj
p(i, ol) + p(i, ∅) >
∑
k:k%oj i;k 6=i
p(k, oj);
contradicting that p was fractionally weakly stable.
Part 2: Let p′ be a fractionally stable random matching that respects non-wastefulness.
Thus, p is non-wasteful. We first show that p is individually rational. Consider an unaccept-
able pair (i, oj) ∈ N × O. Assume that object oj finds agent i unacceptable, i.e., ∅ ≻oj i.
Now consider the pair (dj, oj) ∈ N
′ × O′. Fractional stability of p′ requires
∑
b′:b′%′
dj
oj ;b′ 6=oj
p′(dj, b
′) ≥
∑
a′:a′≺′oj
dj
p′(a′, oj).
Since object oj is the best object for dj at %
′
dj
, it follows that
∑
b′:b′%′idj ;b
′ 6=dj
p′(dj, b
′) = 0.
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Hence,
∑
a′:a′≺′oj
dj
p′(a′, oj) = 0 and for each a
′ ≺′oj dj, p
′(a′, oj) = 0. Next, a
′ ≺′oj dj if
and only if a′ ∈ D \ {dj} or [a
′ ∈ N and ∅ ≻oj a
′]. Thus, by the definition of p′, for each
a′ ∈ N such that ∅ ≻oj a
′, p(a′, oj) = p
′(a′, oj) = 0. Symmetrically, starting from agent i
finding agent oj unacceptable, i.e., ∅ ≻oj i, we obtain that for each b
′ ∈ O such that ∅ ≻i b
′,
p(i, b′) = p′(i, b′) = 0. Hence, the generalized random matching p is individually rational.
Next suppose, by contradiction, that p violates one of the inequalities (23). Then, for
some acceptable pair (i, oj) ∈ N ×O,
∑
k:k≺oj i
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj) >
∑
o′:o′%ioj ;o′ 6=oj
p(i, o′).
Recall that
%′oj=%oj
(
{k ∈ N : k ≻oj ∅}
)
, dj, lex (D \ {dj}) , %oj
(
{k ∈ N : ∅ ≻oj k}
)
and
%′i=%i({o ∈ O : o ≻i ∅}) , φi, lex (Φ \ {φi}) , %i({o ∈ O : ∅ ≻i o}) .
Then, by the definition of %′ and p′ (recall that p(∅, oj) = p
′(dj, oj)),
i ≻oj ∅ implies
∑
k:k≺oj i
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj) =
∑
a′:a′≺′oj
i
p′(a′, oj)
and
oj ≻i ∅ implies
∑
o′:o′%ioj ;o′ 6=oj
p(i, o′) =
∑
b′:b′%′ioj ;b
′ 6=oj
p′(b′, i).
Hence, inequality
∑
k:k≺oj i
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj) >
∑
o′:o′%ioj ;o′ 6=oj
p(i, o′) can be rewritten as
∑
a′:a′≺′oj
i
p′(a′, oj) >
∑
b′:b′%′ioj ;b
′ 6=oj
p′(b′, i),
which contradicts that p′ was fractionally stable.
The following example demonstrates why we had to impose that p′ respects non-
wastefulness in Proposition 29.
Example 6 (A wasteful and fractionally weakly stable associated random match-
ing p′). We consider the general instance I = (N,O,%) with weak preferences and weak
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priorities (the brackets indicate indifferences) that we already have discussed in Example 5:
N = {1, 2, 3}, O = {x, y, z},
%1: [x y] ∅ z
%2: [y z] ∅ x
%3: [x z] ∅ y
%x: [1 3] 2 ∅
%y: [1 2] 3 ∅
%z: [2 3] 1 ∅.
Then, the generalized random matching
p =


1/3 1/3 0
0 1/3 1/3
1/3 0 1/3


is wasteful, individually rational, and satisfies inequalities (23) in the definition of fractional
weak stability.
The associated instance (N ′, O′,%′) is such that N ′ = {1, 2, 3, dx, dy, dz}, O
′ =
{x, y, z, φ1, φ2, φ3} with preferences and priorities (the brackets indicate indifferences):
%′1: [x y] φ1 φ2 φ3 z
%′2: [y z] φ2 φ1 φ3 x
%′3: [x z] φ3 φ1 φ2 y
%′x: [1 3] 2 dx dy dz
%′y: [1 2] 3 dy dx dz
%′z : [2 3] 1 dz dx dy
%′φ1 : 1 2 3 [dx dy] dz
%′φ2 : 2 1 3 [dy dz] dx
%′φ3 : 3 1 2 [dx dz] dy
%′dx : x y z [φ1 φ3] φ2
%′dy : y x z [φ1 φ2] φ3
%′dz : z x y [φ2 φ3] φ1
The associated random matching equals
p′ =
x y z φ1 φ2 φ3



1 1/3 1/3 0 | 1/3 0 0
2 0 1/3 1/3 | 0 1/3 0
3 1/3 0 1/3 | 0 0 1/3
— — — — — — —
dx
1/3 0 0 | 1/3 0 1/3
dy 0 1/3 0 | 1/3 1/3 0
dz 0 0 1/3 | 0 1/3 1/3
and does not respect non-wastefulness.
One can now check for each (a, b) ∈ N ′ × O′ that the fractional stability inequalities
(9) are satisfied and hence p′ is fractionally stable. However, since p is wasteful, it is not
fractionally weakly stable. ⋄
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Next, in order to define claimwise weak stability for generalized random matchings, the
notion of a claim can be adjusted as follows: using consumption process language, as long
as agent i consumes objects that are different from and not worse than o he does not envy
lower priority agent j to consume fractions of o and he does not mind fractions of o to
be unassigned, however, once the unassigned amounts of o plus the amount lower priority
agent j has consumed reach agent i’s weak upper contour set at o (not including o), agent i
either envies agent j or complains about wastefulness (unless agent i can fill his remaining
probability quota with object o). An agent i ∈ N has a claim against an agent j ∈ N , if
there exists an object o ∈ O such that (i, o) is an acceptable pair, i ≻o j, and
p(j, o) + p(∅, o) >
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′). (26)
Inequality (26) implies
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1, i.e., agent i receives some fraction of an object
in his strict lower contour set at o or i is not fully matched (if not, this would imply that∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) + p(i, o) = 1 and hence, p(j, o) + p(∅, o) + p(i, o) > 1; a contradiction).
Thus, agent i would want to consume more of object o.
A generalized random matching is claimwise weakly stable if it is individually rational,
non-wasteful, and does not admit any claim.
Definition 25 (Claimwise weak stability for generalized random matchings). A
generalized random matching p is claimwise weakly stable if p is individually rational,
non-wasteful, and for each acceptable pair (i, o) ∈ N × O and each j ∈ N such that i ≻o j,
∑
o′:o′%io;o′ 6=o
p(i, o′) ≥ p(j, o) + p(∅, o). (27)
With the next proposition and example we show that only one direction of the trans-
formation between the base model and the most general model preserves claimwise weak
stability, while the other does not. The intuitive reason that an equivalence result as in the
case of fractional weak stability (Proposition 29) does not hold for claimwise weak stability
(Proposition 30) is as follows: fractional weak stability is a symmetric notion in that a viola-
tion that involves agent i who would like more of object o when facing lower priority agents
is equivalent to a violation that involves object o wanting more of agent i when facing lower
preferred objects while, in contrast, a claim is one-sidedly defined by an agent i wanting
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more of object o when facing one lower priority agent without any implications for object o
wanting more of agent i when facing one lower preferred object.
Proposition 30. The generalized random matching p is claimwise weakly stable if the asso-
ciated random matching p′ is claimwise stable and respects non-wastefulness and individual
rationality.
Proof. Let p be a generalized random matching and p′ its associated random matching. Let
p′ be claimwise stable and respect non-wastefulness and individual rationality. Thus, p is
non-wasteful and individual rational. Suppose, by contradiction, that p violates one of the
inequalities (27). Then, for some acceptable pair (i, oj) ∈ N×O and some agent k ∈ N such
that k ≺oj i,
p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj) >
∑
o′:o′%ioj ;o′ 6=oj
p(i, o′).
Furthermore,
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1 and hence, by non-wastefulness, p(∅, oj) = 0. Recall that
%′oj=%oj
(
{k ∈ N : k ≻oj ∅}
)
, dj, lex (D \ {dj}) , %oj
(
{k ∈ N : ∅ ≻oj k}
)
and
%′i=%i({o ∈ O : o ≻i ∅}) , φi, lex (Φ \ {φi}) , %i({o ∈ O : ∅ ≻i o}) .
Then, by the definition of %′ and p′ (recall that p(∅, oj) = p
′(dj, oj) = 0),
k ≺′oj i and p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj) = p
′(k, oj)
and
oj ≻i ∅ implies
∑
o′:o′%ioj ;o′ 6=oj
p(i, o′) =
∑
b′:b′%′ioj ;b
′ 6=oj
p′(b′, i).
Hence, inequality p(k, oj) + p(∅, oj) >
∑
o′:o′%ioj ;o′ 6=oj
p(i, o′) can be rewritten as
p′(k, oj) >
∑
b′:b′%′
i
oj ;b′ 6=oj
p′(b′, i),
which contradicts that p′ was claimwise stable.
Example 7 (A non-wasteful, individually rational, and claimwise weakly stable
generalized random matching p but p′ is not claimwise stable). We reconsider the
example used in the proof of Proposition 10. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and O = {x, y, z}. Consider
the following preferences and priorities:
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≻1: x z y ∅
≻2: y x z ∅
≻3: z x y ∅
≻x: 2 3 1 ∅
≻y: 1 3 2 ∅
≻z : 2 1 3 ∅
Let p be the uniform random matching. Thus,
p =


1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3
1/3 1/3 1/3

 .
Random matching p is claimwise stable (see proof of Proposition 10), individually rational,
and non-wasteful.
The associated instance is I ′ = (N ′, O′,%′) where N ′ = {1, 2, 3, dx, dy, dz}, O
′ =
{x, y, z, φ1, φ2, φ3}, with preferences and priorities:
%′1: x z y φ1 φ2 φ3
%′2: y x z φ2 φ1 φ3
%′3: z x y φ3 φ1 φ2
%′x: 2 3 1 dx dy dz
%′y: 1 3 2 dy dx dz
%′z : 2 1 3 dz dx dy
%′φ1 : 1 2 3 dx dz dy
%′φ2 : 2 1 3 dy dx dz
%′φ3 : 3 1 2 dz dx dy
%′dx : x y z φ2 φ3 φ1
%′dy : y x z φ1 φ3 φ2
%′dz : z x y φ2 φ1 φ3
The associated random matching is
p′ =
x y z φ1 φ2 φ3



1 1/3 1/3 1/3 | 0 0 0
2 1/3 1/3 1/3 | 0 0 0
3 1/3 1/3 1/3 | 0 0 0
— — — — — — —
dx 0 0 0 | 1/3 1/3 1/3
dy 0 0 0 | 1/3 1/3 1/3
dz 0 0 0 | 1/3 1/3 1/3
.
By definition, p′ respects non-wasteful and individually rational with respect to p. However,
p′ is not claimwise stable: agent dx has a justified claim against dz for φ2 because dx ≻φ2 dz,
p′(dz, φ2) = 1/3 and
∑
o′:o′≻dxφ2
p′(i, o′) = 0. ⋄
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Example 6 can also be used to demonstrate why we had to impose that p′ respects
non-wastefulness in Proposition 30: the associated random matching p′ in the example is
also claimwise weakly stable and does not respect non-wastefulness. Hence, the underlying
generalized random matching p is wasteful and hence not weakly claimwise stable. The
following example demonstrates why we had to impose that p′ respects individual rationality
in Proposition 30.
Example 8 (An individually irrational and claimwise weakly stable associated
random matching p′). Let N = {1, 2} and O = {x, y}. Consider the following preferences
and priorities:
≻1: x ∅ y
≻2: [x, y] ∅
≻x: [1, 2] ∅
≻y: [1, 2] ∅
Let p be the uniform random matching. Thus,
p =
(
1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2
)
.
Random matching p is individually irrational, non-wasteful and satisfies inequalities (27) in
the definition of claimwise weak stability.
The associated instance is I ′ = (N ′, O′,%′) where N ′ = {1, 2, dx, dy}, O
′ = {x, y, φ1, φ2},
with preferences and priorities:
%′1: x φ1 φ2 y
%′2: [x, y] φ1 φ2
%′x: [1, 2] dx dy
%′y: [1, 2] dy dx
%′φ1 : 1 2 dx dy
%′φ2 : 2 1 [dx, dy]
%′dx : x y [φ1, φ2]
%′dy : y x [φ1, φ2]
The associated random matching equals
p′ =
x y φ1 φ2



1 1/2 1/2 | 0 0
2 1/2 1/2 | 0 0
— — — — —
dx 0 0 | 1/2 1/2
dy 0 0 | 1/2 1/2
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and does not respect individual rationality. We argue that p′ is claimwise stable. Agent 1
gets 1/2 of x and thus does not have a justified claim for φ1 or φ2 against dx or dy. Agent 2
gets a best possible outcome and thus has no justified claim. Agents dx or dy cannot have a
justified claim against agent 1 or 2 because the latter have higher priority. Finally, agents dx
and dy have no justified claim against each other. ⋄
It follows easily that if we restrict attention to generalized deterministic matchings, then
all the stability concepts for generalized random matchings coincide with standard weak
stability (Definition 19). The proof of Proposition 31 follows the same arguments as the
proof of our previous Propositions 2 and 11 and we therefore omit it.
Proposition 31. For generalized deterministic matchings, all the stability concepts for gen-
eralized random matchings with weak preferences and weak priorities coincide with weak
stability for deterministic matchings.
Our previous results (Figure 2 together with Propositions 26 – 30) now imply the following
taxonomy of the stability concepts for generalized random matchings and their associated
random matching in Figure 4.
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Section 3 results: For any generalized random matching p and its associated random
matching p′, we have
no ex-ante envy,
p and non-wastefulness,
individual rationality
(Defs. 20, 15, and 16)
p′ ex-ante weakly stable (Def. 9)
p′ robust ex-post weakly stable (Def. 11)
and non-wasteful
p′ ex-post weakly stable (Def. 10)
and non-wasteful
p′ fractionally weakly stable (Def. 12)
and non-wasteful
p′ claimwise weakly stable (Def. 13),
non-wasteful and individually rational
p ex-ante weakly stable (Def. 21)
p robust ex-post weakly stable (Def. 23)
p ex-post weakly stable (Def. 22)
p fractional weakly stable (Def. 24)
p claimwise stable (Def. 25)
Prop. 23
Prop. 25
Prop. 27
Prop. 26
Prop. 29
Ex. 7
Prop. 30
Prop. 24
Figure 4: Relations between stability concepts for generalized random matchings with
weak preferences and weak priorities and equivalences of stability concepts for associated
random matchings.
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4 Conclusion
We presented a taxonomy of stability concepts (ex-ante; robust ex-post, ex-post, fractional,
and claimwise) for the most well-studied but restricted setting in which (1) preferences are
strict, (2) priorities are strict, (3) there is an equal number of agents and objects, (4) all
objects and agents are acceptable to each other. The formalization lead to a clear picture
of the hierarchy of stability concepts. We then extended these concepts to the most general
model that has none of the restrictions (1) – (4). We formalized the stability concepts with
the appropriate additional requirements of non-wastefulness and/or individual rationality
when necessary to preserve the hierarchy we established in the base model. We found that
it was an extremely subtle task to identify when additionally requiring individual rationality
or non-wastefulness is redundant or when it is critical to preserve the logical relations and
characterizations that were identified in the base model. We also took these factors into
account when obtaining our characterization results for preserving stability concepts when
transforming the most general model to the base model. Throughout the paper, we comple-
ment our results with minimal examples where converse statements do not hold or when a
certain characterization cannot be extended. We are hopeful that the groundwork in this
paper will provide the base for further market design and axiomatic work on probabilistic
matching under priorities.
A Appendix: Weak and strong stochastic dominance
stability (Manjunath, 2013) re-examined
In this section, we point out connections with weak and strong stochastic dominance (sd)
stable matchings as studied by Manjunath (2013) for the base model as introduced in Sec-
tion 2 (with an equal number of agents and objects and strict preferences / priorities). Note
that our model involves ordinal preferences of agents over objects and ordinal priorities of
objects over agents. These preferences / priorities can be extended to preferences / priorities
over random allocations via the first order stochastic dominance relation.
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Definition 26 (First order stochastic dominance). Given two random matchings p and
q and an agent i ∈ N with preference o1 ≻i o2 ≻i . . . ≻i on over O = {o1, . . . , on}, we say
that agent i sd-prefers match p(i) to match q(i), denoted by p(i) %sdi q(i), if and only if,
p(i, o1) ≥ q(i, o1)
p(i, o1) + p(i, o2) ≥ q(i, o1) + q(i, o2)
p(i, o1) + p(i, o2) + p(i, o3) ≥ q(i, o1) + q(i, o2) + q(i, o3)
...
If p(i) %sdi q(i) and p(i) 6= q(i), then p(i) ≻
sd
i q(i).
Given two random matchings p and q and an object o ∈ O with priorities i1 ≻o i2 ≻o
. . . ≻o in over N = {i1, . . . , in}, we say that object o sd-prioritizes match p(o) to match
q(o), denoted by p(o) %sdo q(o), if and only if
p(i1, o) ≥ q(i1, o)
p(i1, o) + p(i2, o) ≥ q(i1, o) + q(i2, o)
p(i1, o) + p(i2, o) + p(i3, o) ≥ q(i1, o) + q(i2, o) + q(i2, o)
...
If p(o) %sdo q(o) and p(o) 6= q(o), then p(o) ≻
sd
o q(o).
The definitions of Manjunath’s weak and strong stochastic dominance stability are based
on the following two pairwise blocking notions.
Definition 27 (Weak and strong (pairwise) sd-blocking; Manjunath, 2013). A ran-
dom matching p is weakly sd-blocked by pair (i, o) ∈ N×O if there exists a corresponding
deterministic matching q 6= p such that q(i, o) = 1 and
neither p(i) ≻sdi q(i) nor p(o) ≻
sd
o q(o).
A random matching p is strongly sd-blocked by pair (i, o) ∈ N × O if there exists a
corresponding deterministic matching q 6= p such that q(i, o) = 1 and
q(i) ≻sdi p(i) and q(o) ≻
sd
o p(o).
Definition 28 (Weak and strong sd-stability; Manjunath, 2013). A random matching
p is weakly sd-stable if there exists no pair (i, o) ∈ N × O that strongly sd-blocks p.
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A random matching p is strongly sd-stable if there exists no pair (i, o) ∈ N × O that
weakly sd-blocks p.
Proposition 32. A random matching is strongly sd-stable if and only if it is ex-ante stable.
Proof. Suppose random matching p has ex-ante envy. Then, there exist i, j ∈ N and
o, o′ ∈ O such that p(i, o′) > 0, p(j, o) > 0, o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j. Consider a corresponding
deterministic matching q 6= p such that q(i, o) = 1. Thus, neither p(i) ≻sdi q(i) nor p(o) ≻
sd
o
q(o). Hence, p is weakly sd-blocked by pair (i, o) and not strongly sd-stable.
Suppose random matching p is not strongly sd-stable. Then, there exists a pair (i, o) ∈
N×O that weakly sd-blocks p, i.e., there exists a corresponding deterministic matching q 6= p
such that q(i, o) = 1 and neither p(i) ≻sdi q(i) nor p(o) ≻
sd
o q(o). Note
∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) =
1 would imply p(i) ≻sdi q(i) and
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) = 1 would imply p(o) ≻sdo q(o). Thus,∑
o′:o′%io
p(i, o′) < 1 and
∑
j:j%oi
p(j, o) < 1. Then, there exist j ∈ N and o′ ∈ O such that
p(i, o′) > 0, p(j, o) > 0, o ≻i o
′, and i ≻o j. Hence, p is not ex-ante stable.
Proposition 33. If a random matching p is claimwise weakly stable, then it is weakly sd-
stable.
Proof. Suppose random matching p is not weakly sd-stable. Then, there exists a pair
(i, o) ∈ N × O that strongly sd-blocks p, i.e., there exists a corresponding deterministic
matching q 6= p such that q(i, o) = 1 and q(i) ≻sdi p(i) and q(o) ≻
sd
o p(o). Note that
q(o) ≻sdo p(o) implies
∑
j:k≻oi
p(k, o) = 0 and p(i, o) < 1. Hence, there exists an agent j ∈ N
such that i ≻o j and p(j, o) > 0. Furthermore, q(i) ≻
sd
i p(i) implies
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) = 0.
Thus, p(j, o) >
∑
o′:o′≻io
p(i, o′) and agent i has a claim against agent j and p is not claimwise
stable.
Proposition 34. Weak sd-stability does not imply claimwise stability.
Proof. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and O = {x, y, z}. Consider the following preferences and priori-
ties:
≻1: x z y
≻2: y x z
≻3: z x y
≻x: 2 3 1
≻y: 1 3 2
≻z : 2 1 3
Consider the random matching
p =


1/4 1/2 1/4
1/4 1/4 1/2
1/2 1/4 1/4

 .
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First, note that agent 2 wants more of object x, 2 ≻x 3, and p(3, x) =
1
2
> 1
4
=
∑
o:o≻2x
p(2, o).
Hence, agent 2 has a claim against agent 3 and p is not claimwise stable.
Second, we show that random matching p is weakly sd-stable by checking that for no
pair (i, o) ∈ N × O with corresponding deterministic matching q 6= p such that q(i, o) = 1,
q(i) ≻sdi p(i) and q(o) ≻
sd
o p(o).
• For an agent i ∈ N and his most preferred object o ∈ O, q(o) 6≻sdo p(o) because all
other agents have higher priority for that object.
• For an agent i ∈ N and his second or third preferred object, q(i) 6≻sdi p(i) because
agent i receives his best object with positive probability.
References
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A. and T. So¨nmez (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach.
American Economic Review 93 (3), 729—747.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A. (2013). School choice. In N. Vulkan, A. E. Roth, and Z. Neeman (Eds.),
Handbook of Market Design, Chapter 5, pp. 138–169. Oxford University Press.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., P. A. Pathak, and A. E. Roth (2005). The New York City high school
match. American Economic Review 95 (2), 364–367.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A., P. A. Pathak, A. E. Roth, and T. So¨nmez (2005). The Boston public
school match. American Economic Review 95 (2), 368–371.
Abdulkadirog˘lu, A. and T. So¨nmez (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach.
American Economc Review 93 (3), 729–747.
Afacan, M. O. (2015). The object allocation problem with random priorities. Working Paper.
Aharoni, R. and T. Fleiner (2003). On a lemma of scarf. Journal of Combinatorial Theory
Series B 87, 72–80.
Aziz, H., S. Mackenzie, L. Xia, and C. Ye (2015). Ex post efficiency of random assignments.
In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-
Agent Systems (AAMAS), pp. 1639–1640.
59
Balinski, M. and T. So¨nmez (1999). A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. Journal
of Economic Theory 84 (1), 73–94.
Birkhoff, G. (1946). Three observations on linear algebra. Revi. Univ. Nac. Tucuma´n. Rev.
Ser. A 5, 147–151.
Biro´, P. and T. Fleiner (2016). Fractional solutions for capacitated NTU-games, with appli-
cations to stable matchings. Discrete Optimization (Part A) 22, 241–254.
Blum, Y., A. E. Roth, and U. G. Rothblum (1997). Vacancy chains and equilibration in
senior-level labor markets. Journal of Economic Theory 76 (2), 362–411.
Bogomolnaia, A. and H. Moulin (2001). A new solution to the random assignment problem.
Journal of Economic Theory 100 (2), 295–328.
Brandl, F., F. Brandt, and H. G. Seedig (2016). Consistent probabilistic social choice.
Econometrica 84 (5), 1839–1880.
Dobzinski, S., N. Nisan, and M. Schapira (2006). Truthful randomized mechanisms for
combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing (STOC), pp. 644–652. ACM Press.
Dog˘an, B. and K. Yildiz (2016). Efficiency and stability of probabilistic assignments in
marriage problems. Games and Economic Behavior 95, 47–58.
Ehlers, L., I. E. Halafir, M. B. Yenmez, and M. A. Yildirim (2003). School choice with
controlled constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds. Journal of Economic Theory 153,
648–683.
Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. American
Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.
Gibbard, A. (1977). Manipulation of schemes that mix voting with chance. Economet-
rica 45 (3), 665–681.
Horn, R. A. (1986). Topics in Matrix Analysis. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University
Press.
Irving, R. W. (1994). Stable marriage and indifference. Discrete Applied Mathematics 48,
261—272.
60
Kamada, Y. and F. Kojima (2017). Stability concepts in matching under distributional
constraints. Journal of Economic Theory 168, 107–142.
Kesten, O. and U. U¨nver (2015). A theory of school choice lotteries. Theoretical Eco-
nomics 10, 543—595.
Kojima, F. and M. Manea (2010). Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism. Journal
of Economic Theory 145 (1), 106–123.
Manjunath, V. (2013). Stability and the core of probabilistic marriage problems. Technical
Report 1809941, SSRN.
Pathak, P. A. (2011). The mechanism design approach to student assignment. Annual
Reviews of Economics 3, 513–536.
Roth, A. E. (1986). On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: A general property of
two-sided matching markets. Econometrica 54 (2), 425–427.
Roth, A. E., U. G. Rothblum, and J. H. Vande Vate (1993). Stable matchings, optimal
assignments, and linear programming. Mathematics of Operations Research 18 (4), 803–
828.
Rothblum, U. G. (1992). Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a poly-
tope. Mathematical Programming 54 (1-3), 57–67.
Schlegel, J. C. (2016). Some properties of ex-ante stable lotteries. Cahier de recherches
e´conomiques du DEEP No. 16.23.
Teo, C.-P. and J. Sethuraman (1998). The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its
applications. Mathematics of Operations Research 23 (4), 874–891.
Vande Vate, J. H. (1989). Linear programming brings marital bliss. Operations Research
Letters 8 (3), 147–153.
Von Neumann, J. (1953). A certain zero-sum two-person game equivalent to the optimal
assignment problem. In H. Kuhn and A. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of
Games. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Wu, Q. and A. E. Roth (2016). The lattice of envy-free matchings. Working Paper.
61
